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INTRODUCTION

It has been thirteen years since the Texas Supreme Court rendered its decision in Texas Oil.& Gas Corp. v. Vela,1 construing
the royalty obligation of a lessee under an oil, gas, and mineral
lease providing for the payment of royalty on gas produced thereunder based upon a fraction of the production's market price. In
Vela, the court held that, for gas royalty purposes, "market price"
is to be determined by comparing contract prices for gas currently
negotiated in the relevant market area, without regard to the price
actually received by the lessee in sales of the subject production
made pursuant to long-term gas sale agreements. The limited effect of the Vela decision was that the lessee was required to pay
gas royalty at the currently prevailing market price for gas, as determined from time to time even though contractually bound to
sell such gas at a lower price pursuant to a life-of-the-lease contract. The broader result of the decision, however, was the institution of a large volume of litigation arising under Texas law by royalty owners seeking increased gas royalty upon the theory that
their respective lessees had breached a duty to pay royalty on the
basis of the production's market value.2 The initiation of such liti1. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
2. See, e.g., Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980) (consolidated
appeal of Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Tex. 1977) and Brent v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978)); Hemus & Co. v.
Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978); First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon
Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted); Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613

S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Similar litigation has arisen under the law of other states as well. See,
e.g., Domatti v. Exxon Corp., 494 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. La. 1980); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
562 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1977); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978).
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gation logically coincided with the nation's energy shortage and the
resultant increase in price differentials between sales of gas committed to be sold under long-term gas sale contracts made during
the period when the price of gas was at relatively low levels, and
sales of newly discovered reserves or sales under renegotiated gas
sale contracts.
The royalty owners frequently were successful in litigation of
this type, recovering market value royalties based upon the higher
current gas market prices. In these cases, however, the Texas
courts, and courts of jurisdictions applying Texas law, failed to
provide producers and royalty owners with clear guidelines for determining the market value of the gas involved, and for determining when, if at all, to apply the market value standard. As a result,
producers and royalty owners alike remained confused about how
to properly determine their royalty obligations or rights.
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court attempted to clarify this
area of Texas law in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton.' While Middleton
answered some of the questions that previously plagued producers
and royalty owners, the decision failed to respond decisively to all
of the issues raised by Vela. In fact, Middleton has created additional problems concerning the proper determination of a producer's royalty obligation.
II.

PRELUDE TO THE EXPLOSION OF MARKET VALUE GAS ROYALTY
LITIGATION

The term "royalty" has come to have a well-defined meaning in
the oil and gas industry and the courts as well. Royalty refers to an
interest in minerals, held either by grant or reservation, which entitles the owner to a share of the product or profit obtained from
the extraction of those minerals from the land as compensation for
allowing another to deplete his minerals.' Royalty generally constitutes the prime element of consideration flowing to the lessor
under an oil, gas, and mineral lease. The royalty clause in such a
lease provides the standard by which the lessee's obligation to
3. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
4. See J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 115 (5th Cir. 1966); Watkins v.
Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179, 181, 189 S.W.2d 699, 700 (1945); Ashabranner, The Oil and Gas
Lease Royalty Clause-One-Eighth of What?, ROCKY MT. 20TH ANN. MINERAL LAW INST.

163, 172 (1975).
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compensate its lessor, either in product or money, is established.
This standard, insofar as it relates to gas production, is typically
based upon a fraction of either the "proceeds of the sale" of the
gas, or the "market value" of the production, or the "market price"
of the production, or some combination thereof.6 The most common gas royalty provision provides that the lessee shall pay as royalty the market value at the well of a specified fraction of the gas
sold or used off the lease and a fraction of the amount realized
from the sale of the gas which is sold at the well. The construction
5. See generally E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 6.01 (1973 ed.); 3 E.
KUNZ, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.4 (1967); W. SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS §8 571-650 (1958);
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 650 (1964).
6. Another type of royalty clause exists, which provides for the payment of royalty
through an "in kind" transfer to the royalty owner of his share of the production by delivery
thereof into the purchaser's pipeline for the benefit of the royalty owners. This clause is
often employed in connection with the lessee's royalty obligation with respect to oil produced under the lease. The provision, however, is rarely found in gas royalty clauses because
gas, due to its volatile nature, cannot be stored safely or efficiently and must be disposed of
immediately, thus encouraging the payment of gas royalty in cash. W. SUMMERS, OIL AND
GAS §§ 571-650 (1958); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 650 (1964). See also
R. SULLIVAN, OIL AND GAS § 65 (1955); Ashabranner, The Oil and Gas Lease Royalty
Clause-One-Eighth of What?, ROCKY MT. 20rH ANN. MINERAL LAW INST. 163, 195-96
(1975); Note, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 291, 292 n.9 (1967).
The impact of the physical differences between oil and gas, in addition to being reflected in the terms of the respective royalty clauses, is also revealed in the marketing techniques applicable to these substances. Under the customary oil, gas, and mineral lease in
Texas, full ownership of the gas in place rests with the lessee and is marketed by him without direction from the lessor. Of course, the lessee must account to the lessor for the latter's
royalty share of the proceeds or value of production after it is sold. By comparison, the
lessor, by the terms of the oil royalty clause in his lease, directs the lessee how to dispose of
the former's share of the oil production. As indicated, the usual method provides for the
lessee to deliver the lessor's oil to the pipeline to which the lessee's wells are connected. The
purchaser of the lessee's oil also usually buys the royalty oil and, pursuant to division orders, agrees to pay the "posted price" (i.e., market price) in the field for the oil. The posted
price applicable to such sales is that prevailing at the time the oil is "run," that is, when
physical possession of the oil changes from the lessee's wells or storage tanks to the purchaser's pipeline or storage tanks. For an exceliant discussion of these marketing techniques,
see Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (Preslar, C.J., dissenting).
7. The fractional amount of the royalty on oil or gas is commonly 1/8th of the production, less a proportionate share of the applicable severance tax. Of course, the amount of
royalty is a matter of negotiation between the parties to the lease and will vary with the
circumstances. In the past there was some distinction made between the terms "market
price" and "market value" as used in gas royalty clauses. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Bynum, 155 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 714 (1946). However, in more
recent times that distinction has been held to be one without a difference. See J. M. Huber
Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 107 n.5 (5th Cir. 1966). For a discussion of these "standard"
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of this form of gas royalty clause produced much of the recent
market value gas royalty litigation.

Although the Vela-type market value gas royalty claim has only
reached its current popularity within the past decade, the circum-

stances which give rise to the claim may be traced to the execution
by lessees of long-term gas sale contracts coupled with the use of a
market value gas royalty standard in the corresponding lease
agreements. 8 These rather unfortunate circumstances were, in part,
the result of the impact upon mineral lessees of their duty to market production promptly, the prevailing practicalities of marketing
gas, and the inartful drafting of gas royalty clauses in oil, gas, and
mineral leases. Then, as now, these leases were construed by
courts to contain various implied covenants, all of which require
the lessee to act in some fashion to protect the interest of its lessor." One such convenant, the implied covenant to market production promptly and reasonably, obligates the lessee, once commercial production is obtained, to market the oil or gas with due
diligence on the best possible terms. 10 Failure to comply with this
covenant will subject the lessee to an action for damages." Thus,

royalty provisions, see 1 E.

BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES §6.00 (2d ed. 1973);
Comment, The Gas Royalty Clause of an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11 SOUTH TEx. L. J.
405 (1970); Comment, Value of Lessor's Share of Production Where Gas Only Is Produced,
25 TEXAS L. REV. 641 (1947). For cases involving the construction of these "standard" royalty provisions, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 714 (1946) ("market price"); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oschner, 146 F.2d 138 (5th
Cir. 1944) ("market value"); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1977) (comparable "market value" and "proceeds" clauses); Upham v. Ladd, 128 Tex. 14, 95 S.W.2d 365
(1936) ("proceeds of sale").
8. See Hoffman, Oil and Gas Royalty Problems-CurrentIssues and Answers, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 31ST INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAx. 211, 211-13 (1980).
9. The implied covenants which burden the lessee's interest include, among others, the
covenant to protect the lease from being drained of hydrocarbons, the covenant to reasonably develop the leased premises, the covenant to market production obtained from the
leased premises with dispatch, the covenant to use reasonable care in operations conducted
on the lease, and, when appropriate, the covenant to seek favorable administrative action to
aid the discharge of the lessee's duties under the lease. See generally R. HEMINGWAY, THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 8.1-.13 (1971); 2 W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS LAW §§ 391-400 (1959); 5
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 801-85 (1964).
10. See Knight v. Chicago Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 105, 188 S.W.2d 564, 567 (1945); Cole
Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 64, 41 S.W.2d 414, 416 (1931);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 285-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1981); Masterson v. Amarillo Oil
Co., 253 S.W. 908, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923, writ dism'd).
11. See Knight v. Chicago Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 105, 188 S.W.2d 564, 567 (1945); Cole
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the implied covenant to market production places a great deal of
pressure upon mineral lessees possessing leaseholds with potential
gas production to obtain production and enter into gas sale agreements at the earliest possible date."2
The business realities of marketing gas, which result from the
physical properties of gas itself, often preclude the prompt action
required of a lessee under the implied covenant to market. Due to
its volatile nature, gas cannot be produced and sold unless pipeline
systems are available to transport the gas to the place it is to be
consumed. Unlike liquid hydrocarbons, gas cannot be stored in
surface containers, nor can it be transported by truck. Rather, gas
normally is marketable only when the reserves in the field where
the lease is situated justify the sizeable capital expenditure necessary to construct and lay a pipeline capable of transporting the gas
to its market destination." Pipeline systems, of course, are complex creatures and are quite expensive to construct. Investors traditionally have not been willing to build pipelines unless gas is
available in a sufficient quantity and has been committed to the
pipeline for an adequately long period, thereby providing the investors with reasonable assurance that they will make a profit on
their investment. Thus, the justification for the capital expenditure
necessary to construct the pipeline usually comes in the form of
long-term gas sale contracts which effectively commit the volume
of gas to be sold to the purchaser who will transport the gas
1 4
through its pipeline to the point of consumption.
Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 64, 41 S.W.2d 414, 416 (1931);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 285-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1981).
12. This is clearly shown in the area of market value gas royalty litigation. For example,
the lease in Vela was executed in 1933 and promptly thereafter, in 1934, a gas sale contract
was entered into as to this production. Other such contracts subsequently were entered into
in 1935 and 1937. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 868-70 (Tex. 1968).

13. Morris, The Gas Royalty Clause- What Is Market Value?, Sw.
& GAS LAW & TAX. 63, 65 (1974).

LEGAL FOUNDATION

25TH INST. ON OIL

14. Id. Even the courts expressly have recognized the existence of these economic "facts
of life" in the gas industry. See Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 714
(1946); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1966), rev'd, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968); Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820, 828 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ). As stated by the Foster court:
The practicalities of the gas industry require that gas be sold under long-term
contracts because the pipelines must have a committed source of supply sufficient to
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These circumstances, in conjunction with the market value gas
royalty clauses contained in oil, gas, and mineral leases, began to
produce inequitable results in gas royalty payment obligations during the 1960's and 1970's. During that period, the prevailing price
of gas sold under relatively new gas sale agreements began to exceed the price established under older, fixed-price, long-term gas
sale contracts, and the royalty payable under leases corresponding
to the new contracts began to exceed that paid to royalty owners
under leases corresponding to the older gas sale contracts." At the
same time, it became apparent that producers of gas who had executed older mineral leases, the terms of which provided for the
payment of gas royalty based on the market value of gas produced
thereunder, were, in fact, customarily compensating their royalty
owners by payment based on the proceeds received from the sale of
such gas, and not necessarily in accordance with the market value
of the gas."' Royalty owners, believing that the gas royalty payments they had been receiving did not comport with the traditional notion of market value,1 7 began to initiate actions to recover
alleged underpayments of royalty, asserting that their gas royalties
should have been determined by reference to the current market
value of the gas, rather than the lower sales price of the gas on
justify financing, construction, and operation. The impact of this economic fact on
the royalty clause of the Foster-Atlantic lease produces the problem presented here.
Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964).
15. In the 1970's gas prices dramatically increased with respect to new reserves, and the
differential between gas sale prices under old and new contracts became magnified. Specifically, from 1972 to the third quarter of 1975, the price of intrastate gas uncommitted to any
contract rose from 20o per Mcf to over $2.00 per Mcf. See Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land
Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Butler v. Exxon
Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Thus, many
royalty owners became aware that while their lessee was perhaps selling (and being compelled to sell) the gas produced from their lease at 200 per Mcf pursuant to a 20-year contract entered into during a period of reduced demand, newly developed reserves were being
sold under fresh gas sale contracts to intrastate purchasers at $2.00 per Mcf. Hoffman, Oil
and Gas Royalty Problems-Current Issues and Answers, 31 Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 31ST
INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAX. 211, 212-13 (1980).
16. See Ashabranner, The Oil and Gas Lease Royalty Clause-One-Eighth of What?,
ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW 20TH ANN. INST. 163, 172 (1975); Kelly, What Price, Gas?, 7 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 333, 338 (1975).
17. "Market value" traditionally is defined as the price property will bring when
offered
for sale by one who desires to sell, but is not obligated to sell, and when bought by one who
desires to buy, but is under no necessity of buying. State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 618-19
89 S.W.2d 979, 980 (1936) (on motion for rehearing); Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573
S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

which their royalty was actually based. 8
Although the amount of royalty to be paid for gas pursuant to
market value royalty clauses has long been the subject of litigation,' the specific issue involved here, the determination, for royalty purposes, of the "market value" of gas sold under a long-term
contract, did not initially arise until 1964 with the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co. 20 Even there, the court
did not squarely face the issue in construing the terms of the royalty clause before it. In Foster, the mineral lease's royalty clause
required the lessee to pay royalty on 1/8th of the gas produced and
saved from the leased premises on the basis of the "market price
... prevailing for the field where produced when run. '2 The
lessee had entered into a twenty-year gas sale contract with respect
to this production some years before and consistently had paid
royalty on such gas on the basis of the proceeds received from the
sale of the gas. At the time of suit, the royalty payments were
based upon a contract price which was significantly below that
which the royalty owners alleged was the prevailing market price
for gas produced from the particular field during the time period
involved."
The Fifth Circuit affrmed the trial court's judgment awarding

18. Federal courts served as the forum for the initial batch of such litigation involving
the calculation of royalty with respect to gas committed to, and sold in, the interstate market. See, e.g., J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 108 (5th Cir. 1966); Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1966); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329
F.2d 485, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1964). Vela, however, was the first definitive decision on the issue
dealt with in this article.
19. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 714 (1946); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d *185 (5th Cir. 1946); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochaner, 146 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1944); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944).
20. 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964).
21. Id. at 490 (emphasis added). The phrase "when run," as used in connection with oil,
customarily refers to the time when physical possession of the oil changes from the lessee's
wells or storage tanks to the oil purchaser's pipeline or storage tanks. See Butler v. Exxon
Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Preslar, C. J.,
dissenting).
22. The lessee's royalty payment was based on a contract price of 10t per Mcf while the
market price of gas in the field at the time was 13c per Mcf in 1957 and 14 per Mcf in
1958-1962. Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1964). The term "Mcf" is
the standard unit for measuring the volume of natural gas. It is an abbreviation or acronym
for the words "thousand cubic feet." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL
OF TERMS 337 (1978).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss1/1

8

Hollimon: Exxon Corporation v. Middleton: Some Answers but Additional Confu

1981]

EXXON CORP. v. MIDDLETON

damages to the royalty owner in an amount equal to the difference
between the royalty received and that which would have been received under a market value measurement. In so holding, however,
the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the royalty clause expressly provided for the payment of royalty based upon the market price of
gas prevailing in the field where the gas was produced at the time
of delivery.2 The court, therefore, was called upon to construe a
royalty clause which expressly addressed the time when the prevailing market price was to be determined under circumstances in
which the basis for determining the market value of the subject
gas, and the actual market value computation as well, were not in
dispute. Although the Foster court was not required to address the
issues that frame most current market value royalty litigation, and
to that extent the decision is distinguishable from the precedenttial decisions on the point,24 the court did foreshadow the simplistic rationale employed by many courts addressing true market
value gas royalty situations when it stated:
Stripped of all the trimmings Atlantic's position is simply: We
cannot comply. This is no answer. The lease calls for royalty based
on the market price prevailing for the field where produced when
run. The fact that the ascertainment of future market price may be
troublesome or that the royalty provisions are improvident and result in a financial loss to Atlantic "is not a web of the Court's weaving." Atlantic cannot expect the court to rewrite the lease to Atlan5
tic's satisfaction.'
Four years after the Foster decision the issues involved in a
claim for additional royalty on gas committed for sale under a
long-term contract, based upon the alleged right to have such royalty calculated by reference to the current market value of the gas,
were more fully addressed when the Texas Supreme Court issued

23. The phrase "when run" was summarily construed by the court to mean the time of
delivery. This was done even though that phrase is foreign to gas marketing and the gas
industry generally and is indigenous only to the marketing of oil. See Foster v. Atlantic Ref.
Co., 329 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1964). See cases and material cited note 6 supra.
24. Indeed, many industry representatives considered the terms of the royalty clause in

Foster to be so unusual that they believed the "when run" language contained therein
played a central role in the Foster court's decision and considered the Foster decision as

being effectively limited to its facts. Consequently, the result in Vela surprised many persons in the industry despite the clear implication of the language in Foster.
25. Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 1964).
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its decision in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela.

6

In Vela, the roy-

26. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). During the intervening four years, the Fifth Circuit
rendered decisions in Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966)
and J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966), both of which involved
market value gas royalty claims. Neither decision, however, fully addressed the issue of the
proper method for determining the market value of gas in a gas royalty claim context.
The Weymouth decision focused on the portion of the market value test which requires
a comparison of comparable sales. The lessor asserted that the trial court erred in permitting certain expert testimony of gas sales made by other lessee-pipelines located in the vicinity of the leased premises because they were not arm's-length sales and, therefore, were
not comparable market value sales. The lessor also contended that testimony of comparable
sales should be limited to sales of gas from leases having market value gas royalty clauses
and which were entered into at about the same time and place as the lease under examination and that resort to comparable sales should be permitted only after it is shown there is
no market value for the gas in question and some reference has been made to other methods
of arriving at some fair value.
The Weymouth court stated that, especially with regard to gas committed to the interstate market, there is never any exactly comparable sale. The court also showed that because of the complex and pervasive federal regulatory scheme applicable to interstate gas,
traditional notions of market value (i.e. the price which a willing buyer would pay and a
willing seller would accept, after fair negotiation, with neither party acting under compulsion) are inapplicable to such a determination to be made with regard to interstate gas.
Having marshalled ample evidence to support its position that the interstate gas market is
"in no sense a 'free' market," and that no interstate gas sales are truly the result of arm'slength bargaining, the Weymouth court concluded that all expert testimony of "fairly comparable" sales is admissible on the matter of the market value of the subject gas. Any questions of relevancy concerning such testimony were held to simply bear upon the weight of
that evidence which properly would be considered by the jury in its capacity as the trier of
fact.
Thus, Weymouth did not address the matter of how to determine market value of gas
committed to be sold under a long-term gas sale agreement; rather, it addressed what evidence is admissible on the issue of comparable sales, only one small part of such a market
value determination. Moreover, Weymouth referred the case to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the federal agency which at that time governed the regulation of interstate gas,
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction for a determination of the agency's jurisdiction to regulate the rates to be paid as royalty on gas production. For these reasons, the
Weymouth decision has been accorded little precedential significance in connection with
market value gas royalty litigation.
The Denman case held that the relevant "market" to be considered in determining the
market value of gas, for gas royalty claim purposes, cannot be limited to lessee-pipeline
purchases. In Denman, the lessor asserted a claim for additional gas royalties based upon
the lessee's alleged failure to pay royalty on the basis of the market value of that gas as
provided in their lease. The lessee conceded that it had paid gas royalty on the basis of the
proceeds from the sale of the gas, but contended that the proceeds received from the sales
involved also constituted the market value of that gas. The lessee reasoned that certain
actions of the lessor and lessee, taken contemporaneously with the execution of their lease,
demonstrated the parties' intent to limit the market of the gas to that afforded under the
gas sale contract entered into by the lessee and a third party pipeline purchaser. The actions
involved consisted of the lessor having had full knowledge of the gas sale agreement and, in
fact, having affirmatively participated in the commitment of the gas to the contract by re-
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alty owners squarely presented the issue of the effect, if any, of the
commitment of gas under a long-term sale agreement upon a determination of the market value of the gas. The gas involved had
been committed under certain life-of-the-lease sale agreements entered into shortly after the oil, gas, and mineral lease itself had
been executed.2 7 The lease provided for a royalty payment on gas
sold or used off the premises of "one-eighth of the market price at
the wells." At the time suit was filed, the price received by others
under more recently executed gas sale contracts covering gas produced from the field involved far exceeded the proceeds received

quiring the lessee to enter into the contract as a condition precedent to entering into the oil,
gas, and mineral lease. Against this background, the lessee contended that because the affirmative action of the lessor, as well as the lessee, permanently channeled the subject gas
into the specified gas sale contract, the lessor was bound to accept the terms of that contract
as delineating the sole and exclusive market for that gas in determining its market value for
royalty purposes.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the term "market," as descriptive of the buyer
in a sale, is not synonymous with the meaning of that term in fixing value; rather, in the
latter context, the court held the term signifies the theoretical arm's-length transaction between the willing buyer and willing seller, neither of whom is compelled to enter into the
bargain eventually made. The court was aided in its analysis by the fact that the mineral
lease in question originally had contained a royalty clause which made gas royalty payments
calculable upon a fraction of the net proceeds derived from the sale of gas. That clause,
however, had been replaced by the market value royalty language, thus evidencing an intent
by the parties to have gas royalty calculated under the lease on some basis other than actual
sale proceeds.
Thus, Denman, as Weymouth did not face the matter of determining the market value
of gas in the context of a gas royalty claim made with respect to gas committed for sale
under a long-term contract. Indeed, the Denman court specifically noted that the market
value question was yet to be tried and limited its attention to the issue of whether the
actual purchase constituted the market. Moreover, as in Weymouth, the court referred the
case to the FPC for a determination of the above described jurisdictional issue. For these
reasons, and the added consideration that Denman, as Weymouth, simply amounted to an
Erie "educated guess" concerning how the Texas Supreme Court would construe such a
market value gas royalty clause, Denman has also received little precedential recognition
with regard to the proper method for making market value determinations of gas involved
in gas royalty claims.
27. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 868, 869-70 (Tex. 1968). The Vela
lease was executed in 1933 and the gas sale contracts involved were signed between 1934
and 1937. When gas was first discovered on the leased premises, there was no pipeline in the
field. The lessee subsequently entered into a life-of-the-lease gas sale agreement with United
Gas Public Service Company in 1934 and, after acquiring various leases in the field, entered
into several similar gas sale contracts with others. Id. at 869-70. Interestingly, the gas purchaser's rights under those contracts ultimately were assigned to a subsidiary of the defendant-lessee Texas Oil & Gas Corporation, thus creating a situation in which the gas sale
contract involved, at the time of trial and during the period in question was in affiliate
contract. See id. at 875.
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from the sale of the gas pursuant to the lessee's gas sale contracts.28 The royalty owners claimed that the term "market price"
as used in the lease's gas royalty clause, should be given meaning
by reference to current prices in the area rather than in accordance
with the sale proceeds for the gas.2'9 The lessees contended that
since gas could only be marketed under long-term contracts that
fix the price of the gas sold, the "market price" of the gas meant
the amount received for the gas, provided the lessee exercised good
faith in marketing the gas.30
Noting that none of the royalty owners involved in the case had
agreed to accept royalties on the basis of the price stipulated in the
gas sale contracts, the Texas Supreme Court held that regardless
of the economic realities inherent in the marketing of natural gas,3 1
28. The United contract price was 3.5* per Mcf which was reduced to 2.3t per Mcf with
the adoption of the Standard Gas Measurement Law in Texas. Id. at 870. Under gas sale
contracts entered into in 1960 and 1962, other purchasers of gas from the field (Tennessee
Gas Transmission Company and Alamo Gas Supply Company) were paying prices for this
gas ranging from 13t to 17.240 per Mcf. Id. at 870. The lessee's own witness testified that
most gas sale contracts entered into during the relevant period specified a price for this gas
of 124 per Mcf., less compression costs, and another witness of the lessee placed that figure
at 80 per Mcf. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1966), rev'd, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
The precise terms of the royalty clause involved in Vela were as follows: (1) "To deliver
to the credit of lessor, free of cost, in the pipe line to which lessee may connect its or his
wells, the equal one-eighth part of all oil produced and saved from the leased premises."
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. 1968); (2) "To pay to lessor, as
royalty for gas from each well where gas only is found, while the same is being sold or used
off of the premises, one-eighth of the market price at the wells of the amount so sold or
used." Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1966), rev'd, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968); and (3) "To pay to lessor as royalty for gas produced from any oil well and used by lessee for the manufacture of gasoline, one-eighth of
the market value of such gas. If such gas is sold by lessee, then lessee agrees to pay lessor, as
royalty, one-eighth of the net proceeds derived from the sale of said casinghead gas at the
wells." Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. 1968).
29. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d, 866, 870 (Tex. 1968).
30. Id. at 870.
31. Relying heavily upon, and quoting at length from, the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Foster, the court adopted as its own an extended passage from Foster which, in part, states:
When it made the gas sales contract, Atlantic took the calculated risk of that
contract producing royalties satisfactory to the lease terms. The fact that increases in
market prices have made the lease obligations financially burdensome is no
defense. .

..

Stripped of all the trimmings Atlantic's position is simply: We cannot comply.
This is no answer. The lease calls for royalty based on the market price prevailing for
the field where produced when run. The fact that the acertainment of future market
price may be troublesome or that the royalty provisions are improvident and result in
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the royalties to which the royalty owners were entitled depended
solely upon a construction of the governing oil, gas, and mineral

lease, wholly independent of the terms of the gas sale agreements.8 ' The court further noted that the royalty clause of the
Vela lease contained provisions specifying that in certain circumstances the amount of royalty on casinghead gas was to be deter-

mined by reference to the net proceeds received from its sale, and
that the royalty on oil produced under the lease was payable in
kind. The court concluded, therefore, that the parties knew how to
provide for royalties payable on some basis other than market
value and could have so provided with respect to the subject gas

well gas had they desired to do so.as Instead, the parties to the
lease:
stipulated in plain terms that the lessee would pay one-eighth of the
market price at the well of all gas sold or used off the premises. This
clearly means the prevailing market price at the time of the sale or
use. The gas which was marketed under the long-term contracts in
this case was not "being sold" at the time the contracts were made
but at the time of the delivery to the purchaser. [citation omitted]
We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals, therefore, that the contract price for which the gas was sold by the lessee is not necessarily
the market price within the meaning of the lease."
a financial loss to Atlantic "is not a web of the Court's weaving." Atlantic cannot
expect the court to rewrite the lease to Atlantic's satisfaction.
Id. at 871 (quoting Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1964)).
32. Id. at 870. The Vela court's reference to the fact that the royalty owners had not
agreed to accept royalty on the basis of the price specified in the gas sale contract foreshadowed the contention advanced by lessees in some recent Vela-type litigation that the royalty
owners had accepted royalty payments made pursuant to division orders executed by the
royalty owners and, therefore, were estopped to assert any claim for additional royalties. See
note 47 infra and accompanying text.
33. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968).
34. Id. at 871. Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the entire Vela decision, from a
mineral lessee's standpoint, is the holding that gas sold under a long-term contract is sold
not at the time the contract is made, but at the time of each separate delivery of gas to the
purchaser. This statement, coupled with the holding that the applicable gas royalty standard contained in the lease referred to the market price prevailing at the time of the sale,
requires a redetermination of market value of the subject gas, for royalty purposes, with
each delivery of the gas. This theory was adopted again by the court in Middleton. See
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244-46 (Tex. 1981). This theory, however, has
not been universally accepted. See Pierce v. Texas Pac. Oil Co., 547 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.
1976); Apache Gas Prods. Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 509 P.2d 109, 112-13 (Okla..
1973). The Vela court relied upon a single precedent, a 1926 Commission of Appeals decision, Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431, 433 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, judgmt adopted) as its
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Thus, Vela held that when the gas royalty clause of an oil, gas, and
mineral lease is based upon a "market price" standard, the royalty
owner is entitled to royalties based upon the market price of gas
prevailing at the time the gas is physically delivered into its purchaser's pipeline and not upon the market price of the gas as determined at the time of the commitment of the gas under the contract pursuant to which the gas is sold.
The Vela court also addressed the matter of determining the
precise market value of the gas in question. In this regard, the
court held that the market price of gas is "to be determined by
sales of gas comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets,"35 and stated that "the mathematical average of all
prices paid in the field is not a final answer to the difficult problem
of determining market price at any particular time."3 After reauthority for when gas is sold under a long-term contract, and it relied upon Foster for its
conclusion that the "market price" of gas is to be determined by reference to the current
market price as measured from time to time. There is genuine doubt concerning whether
Martin stands for this proposition. Some believe Martin holds only that an "executed sale"
rather than merely a "sale" of gas is effected by a mineral lessee under a long-term gas sale
contract when it delivers such gas to the pipeline. This contention, of course, would justify a
different construction of the word "sold" as used in the gas royalty clauses examined herein.
Moreover, in contexts other than those involving gas royalties, courts have held that the
term "sold" may have a more flexible meaning that that accorded it in Vela. For example,
some courts have held that the term may refer to the single point in time when the property
involved is committed or dedicated to sale by the making of the contract of sale. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 133 Tex. 534, 539, 130 S.W.2d 1026, 1028 (1939); Seabrook Ind.
School Dist. v. Brown, 195 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946, writ ref'd).
Applying this construction of the term in Vela would have resulted in a finding that the
market price of the gas involved should be determined only as of the time when the gas was
committed to be sold under the long-term contract, not periodically as the gas is physically
delivered into the pipeline.
35. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela 429 S.W.2d 866, 872 (Tex. 1968). The comparability
test was "borrowed" by the Vela court from PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196,
199 (5th Cir. 1946). For a good discussion of the Vela decision, and this area of the law
generally, see Comment, Vela: Legacy of Conflict Over Determinationof Market Value for
Royalties on Intrastateand Interstate Gas and Continued Controversy with the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, 11 St. Mary's L.J. 502 (1979). The author, in suggesting that the
Vela market value test should be redefined, indicates a belief that the portion of the test
which relates to availability to market outlet is archaic, considering that today gas has little
difficulty in reaching an available market outlet. Id. at 509. The author suggests that this
aspect of the test could be used to differentiate between sales of gas on the basis of varying
exploration and production costs. This portion of the test could also contemplate a comparison of gas sales on the basis of flowing pressure differentials and thus refer to such items as
compression charge variances and other transportation costs. Id. at 509.
36. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 873 (Tex. 1968).
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viewing the evidence, the court concluded that the testimony of
the royalty owners' expert witness provided the necessary scintilla
of evidence s7 to support the trial court's decision awarding the royalty owners a recovery based on their expert's market value determination." This determination involved the calculation of "an average price" received for gas sold from the field during the period
covered by the lawsuit and was accomplished by the division of the
volumes of gas sold from each well in the field into the value received for this gas. 9 Significantly, the expert's "market value" testimony was corroborated by actual gas sales from wells in the field
37. This part of the appeal was submitted under a "no evidence" point of error. Id. at
869.
38. Id. at 869.
39. Id. at 872. The royalty owners' expert witness, however, did not take into account
all sales of gas from the field in arriving at his "market price." He disregarded all sales of
gas made under certain identified contracts because he considered them "too far out of
line." Id. at 872. The prices on the twelve wells considered ranged from 13t to 17.24t per
Mcf with the average price being 16.04o per Mcf which, when adjusted downward by 3t per
Mcf to account for the low pressure of the gas involved, yielded a "market value" of 13.047€
per Mcf. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1966), rev'd, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). The field involved, the Lopeno Field,
located in Zapata County, Texas, encompassed three sands, the Upper Queen City, the 2700

foot Queen City, and the Wilcox. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 868-69
(Tex. 1968). The deduction for compression charges was made with respect to gas produced
from the Upper Queen City sand due to its low pressure. Id. at 872.
The lessee objected to the testimony of the royalty owners' expert on several grounds,
but the trial court overruled most of these objections, allowing them simply to be taken into
account in assessing the weight to be accorded the testimony. Specifically, the lessees contended that the proffered testimony did not consider quality differences in the gas sold
under the various contracts, or flowing pressure differentials in such gas, and did not consider that some of the gas to which the Vela gas was compared had been sold under a
package deal involving large gas reserves, some of which were regulated by the FPC. The
lessees also asserted there was no evidence of a demand for the Vela gas at the alleged
"market price." Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1966), rev'd, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
The witness recognized that the market price of gas may be affected by the type and
quality of the gas, as well as its pressure, deliverability, and the size of available reserves. He
testified, however, that the size of the reserves were not a significant factor in that case
because pipelines had already been laid into the field and the remaining reserves of the Vela
gas, though smaller than those with which they were compared, were still sufficiently large
to justify a market. He further stated that there was no significant difference between the
quality of the Vela gas and that to which he compared it because all of the gas was being
commingled in the field pipelines and the end use of all such gas was the same. Finally, he
testified that the deliverability of the Vela wells was better than average for the field and
that the flowing pressure differential was neutralized by his allowance of 3t per Mcf reduction in market price allocable to higher compression charges for the Vela gas. Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 872-73 (Tex. 1968).
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at comparable net prices." On this basis, the court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court, as reformed to be consistent with its
opinion.4 1 Although the Vela court accepted the proffered proof as
adequate to support the judgment, it did not provide definitive
standards for calculating the market price of gas which would be
applicable in other circumstances, 42 thus opening the door to a veritable explosion of market value gas royalty litigation.
III.

THE EXPLOSION OF MARKET VALUE GAS ROYALTY LITIGATION

Although the Vela decision did not immediately generate much
action by royalty owners, 43 its rendition ultimately caused an explosion of market value gas royalty litigation. The Vela-type cases
fell into several categories. Some cases involved whether the market value portion or the proceeds portion of a lease's royalty clause
applied, 4 others focused upon the nature of "comparable sales"'
in connection with the proper method for calculating the market
40. Id. at 873. These actual sales were made at net prices ranging from 13.047€ to 14.2c
per Mcf.
41. Four justices joined in a forceful dissent stating that "since it appears that the royalty provision fails to state as of what time the 'market price' is to be determined, . . . we
must look to common practices in the industry at the time the lease contract was made in
1933 to ascertain what was the intention of the parties with reference to this matter." Id. at
879 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that long-term gas sale agreements constituted the only method of marketing gas at the time the Vela lease was executed and therefore it should be presumed that the parties to the lease contracted with that circumstance in
mind. The dissent reasoned, therefore, that the parties knew that the term "market price,"
as used in the lease's royalty clause, necessarily meant the price prevailing for gas under a
long-term contract at the time the lease was signed. Id. at 879 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
The dissent distinguished the Fosterdecision relied upon by the majority on the basis of the
"when run" language contained in the royalty clause of the lease construed in that case. Id.
at 879-80 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). See cases and material cited notes 22, 24, 25 supra.
42. It is apparent from the opinion that the court did not enthusiastically embrace the
mathematical average price put forward by the royalty owners' expert as conclusive of market value. Indeed, it seems clear that the court relied heavily upon the evidence of corroborating sales to bolster this testimony. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d
866, 873 (Tex. 1968).
43. The lapse of time between the decision in Vela and the initiation of similar market
value gas royalty suits is puzzling. Perhaps the potential economic impact of this type of
action was not immediately perceived by the plaintiff's bar.
44. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980); Hemus & Co. v.
Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978); First.Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon
Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted).
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value of the subject gas," and yet others dealt with contentions of
ratification or estoppel.'"
A.

Does the Market Value Standard Apply?

In analyzing the Vela decision and its impact upon the calculation of lessee royalty obligations, one must initially consider that
the determination of gas royalty due under an oil, gas, and mineral
lease is not necessarily a function of the market value of the gas
produced under the lease. This matter rests in the first instance
upon a proper construction of the gas royalty clause involved
which may contain some basis other than market value for making
such a determination. In an effort to avoid the market value gas
royalty pitfalls of Vela, some lessees involved in litigation subsequent to that decision asserted that their gas royalty obligations
were governed by the portion of their lease's royalty clause which
specified that gas royalty be determined on the basis of the proceeds received from the sale of the gas and not its market value. 8
This issue became the focal point of Butler v. Exxon Corp.'" and
assumed a peripheral position in the decision of the court of civil
appeals in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton."
The Butler decision involved the construction of four mineral
leases, three of which provided for the payment of royalties based
upon the market value at the well of a certain fraction of the gas
produced from the land and sold or used off the premises, and
upon a certain fraction of the amount realized from the sale of gas
46. Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.) 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. 1981); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
48. See generally Hoffman, Oil and Gas Royalty Problems-CurrentIssues and An-

swers, Sw.

LEGAL FOUNDATION 31ST INST. ON OIL

& GAS

LAW

&

TAX.

211 (1980).

49. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

50. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. 1981). This was the case selected by the Texas Supreme Court to serve as the vehicle
for its attempt to clarify the application of its Vela decision. In the supreme court the issue
of whether the sales of gas occurred "at the well" or "off the premises" assumed a more
important position.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

produced from the land and sold at the wells.51 During the period
in question, the gas had been delivered to the purchaser at the
tailgate of the lessee's centralized separation, dehydration, and
compression facility located off the leased premises. 2 The expert
testimony offered in the case conflicted as to whether these facts
rendered the Butler gas transactions sales "off the premises," subject to a royalty based upon the market value of the gas, or sales
"at the well," subject to a royalty determination based on the proceeds received from the sale of the gas."8
The court, without engaging in detailed analysis, construed the
royalty clause contained in the Butler leases to provide that the
"market value" portion thereof applied to gas produced and used
"off the premises" and also to gas produced and sold at places

51. The precise terms of the royalty clause contained in the three Butler leases essentially provided as follows:
The royalties to be paid by Lessee are: (a) on oil, one-eighth of that produced
and saved from said land, the same to be delivered at the wells or to the credit of
Lessor into the pipe line to which the wells may be connected; Lessee may from time
to time purchase any royalty oil in its possession, paying the market price therefor
prevailing for the field where produced on the date of purchase; (b) on gas, including
casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said land and sold or used
off the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other product therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas
sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized from such
sale; . . . and (c) on all other minerals mined and marketed, 1/8 either in kind or
value at the well or mine.
Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 412 Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(emphasis added).
The fourth Butler lease contained a gas royalty clause which simply directed the lessee to
pay as royalty "one-sixteenth of the market value at the well of all gas produced and saved
from the leased premises." Id. at 412. The Butler court held that the construction of the
latter clause was exactly controlled by Vela. Id. at 416.
52. Id. at 413.
53. The royalty owners' expert recognized there could be a sale of gas "at the well"
even though delivery was made to the purchaser several hundred feet from the wellhead,
but stated that sales off the leased premises, such as these, were not sales at the well. Id. at
413. Exxon's expert considered these sales to have been made "at the well," defining that
term to mean "a sale in or near the wells as distinguished from [a] tailgate of a plant sale."
Id. at 413. The term "plant," as used here, refers to a gas processing plant which is a facility
where "wet gas," that is, gas containing volumes of natural gas liquids (propane, butane,
natural gasoline, ethane, methane, etc.) is processed for the purpose of extracting those natural gas liquids from the gas stream. The liquids are then either sold collectively in a mixed
form or fractionated into their respective component parts and thereafter sold as individual
products. The "residue gas," that is, the gas stream which remains after the liquids have
been extracted therefrom, is then sold with delivery usually taking place at the tailgate of
the plant.
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other than "at the well"." With regard to gas sold "at the well,"
the court held that the lease specified that the royalty was to be
1/8th of the amount realized from the sale of the gas. 5 In applying
its construction of this royalty clause to the Butler sales, the court
noted that the parties had not used mutually exclusive terms, such
as "at the well" and "away from the well" or "on the premises"
and "off the premises," in fixing the gas royalty obligations under
the lease, thus implying that a sale "at the well" could still involve
delivery "off the premises."" On the basis of this construction and
the meaning assigned to the phrase "at the well" within the petroleum industry, the Butler court held that term "at the well," as
used in the gas royalty clauses before it, meant deliveries of gas
occurring in the vicinity of the field of production where the specific wells were located, rather than at some remote location such
as the other end of a gas transmission line. The court then noted
that, although made off the leased premises, the Butler gas sales
were consummated near the wells and within the field of production and, therfore, constituted sales "at the wells,

'5 7

so that no ad-

ditional royalty was due with respect to them.
In Middleton, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourteenth District faced a similar issue in construing the same royalty
clause, but concluded that the market value portion of the gas royalty clause applied. Part of the gas involved had been processed at
the lessee's gas processing plant located away from the leased
premises and had been delivered to the gas purchaser at the tailgate of the plant.58 The lessee had paid royalties with respect to
this gas on the basis of the proceeds received from the sale of the
54. Id. at 416.
55. Id. at 416.
56. Id. at 416.
57. Id. at 415-16. A similar result was reached in Skaggs v. Heard, 172F. Supp, 813,
817 (S.D. Tex. 1959). The Butler court further stated that "for a sale to be termed 'at the
wells', delivery need not occur at the 'Christmas tree' on top of the well casing, nor is there
any requirement that delivery occur on the particular lease or unit from which the gas is
produced." Butler v. Exxon Corp. 559 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). This part of the court's holding ultimately was disapproved by the Texas Supreme Court in its Middleton decision. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244
(Tex. 1981). The term "Christmas tree" refers to "[t]he assembly of valves, pipes and
fittings used to control the flow of production from the casinghead" of a well. H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 82 (1978).
58. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), revd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
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gas. The court of civil appeals, however, affirming the trial court's
judgment, held that this gas was sold as it was delivered and that
because such sales occurred "off the premises," the market value
portion of the gas royalty clause was applicable.5 As a result, the
court of civil appeals held the lessee liable for the difference between the amount of royalties paid on this gas and the amount of
royalties calculable on the basis of the market value of this gas.
Thus, prior to the supreme court's decision in Middleton, it appeared, somewhat inconsistently, that sales of gas made at the

lessee's own central delivery facilities located off the leased premises constituted sales of gas "at the well" and, depending upon the
language of the applicable gas royalty clause, were not subject to
Vela's market value royalty determination, whereas sales of gas at

the tailgate of a processing plant located off the lease were sales

"off the premises" and subject to Vela's market value royalty
0 In all cases, however, it seemed that
test.1
sales of gas made any-

where on the lease constituted sales "at the well" and qualified for
"proceeds" royalty treatment.
B.

What Are Comparable Sales?
Under the test announced in Vela, the market price of gas for

59. Id. at 364 (by implication).
60. Some analysts considered the decisions in Butler and Middleton to be "squarely in
conflict as to the proper interpretation of the phrases 'off the premises' and 'at the wells'."
Hemingway, Oil And Gas, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 185, 191 (1979). However, the decisions arguably are distinguishable on the basis of the expert testimony offered
in each case and, in this respect, are consistent, if not clearly so. Butler presented a situation involving sales of gas at a central separation and compression facility; Middleton involved sales of gas at a processing plant's tailgate. In both cases, of course, the deliveries
were made away from the leased premises. These elements, without more, would simply
amount to distinctions and not genuine differences. The differentiating feature of these
cases, however, rests with testimony offered by the Butler lessee's expert witness who stated
that "a well head sale is generally considered to be a sale in or near the wells as distinguished from tailgate of a plant sale" and characterized the Butler sales as wellhead sales.
Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(emphasis added). Thus, if the Butler court had decided Middleton on the basis of this
expert testimony (which obviously supplied the basis for the Butler decision), the court
could have reached the same result the Middleton court did on the basis that the Middleton
facts presented a plant tailgate sale of royalty gas and, therefore, constituted a sale "off the
premises."
For a case which discusses the differing effects of a proceeds gas royalty clause and a
market value gas royalty clause, see Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1977). In
Lightcap, however, there was no dispute that the sales involved occurred at the wells.
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royalty purposes is to be determined by reference to sales of gas
"comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing outlets."" The issue of whether particular sales of gas are comparable
sales within the meaning of the Vela test may arise in several contexts; 2 however, the issue of comparability has been litigated al61. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 872-73 (Tex. 1968).
62. Some of these contexts included disputes based upon the quality differentials of'the
gas, quantity differentials in the sales of gas, the regulated or unregulated nature of the sale,
and so forth. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The following passage, quoted from
the United States District Court's opinion in Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America,
discusses several circumstances which may bear upon the comparability issue, a difference
in any one of which could render one sale non-comparable to another:
The opinions given by plaintiffs' expert witnesses must be rejected for two reasons. First, said opinions take into consideration both sales of intrastate and interstate gas in determining "market value." Secondly, it was shown that many of the
interstate gas sales contracts examined and considered by plaintiffs' witnesses reflected prices which were short term or emergency sales prices, small producer prices,
prices allowed for newly discovered gas and prices which were rolled back to the FPC
rate. Under the facts of this case involving vintage gas, a large producer, and where
no special exceptions were shown to exist which would support a petition by either
plaintiffs or defendant to FPC for higher rates, the court is of the opinion that many
of the interstate sales contracts, upon which plaintiffs' market value opinion is based,
are not comparable to determine market value.
Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 160 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 676 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
Another item which at least one court has stated affects comparability is the matter of
daily deliverability. In this regard, the court in First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon
Corp., in holding that the royalty owner involved had failed to prove the market value of the
gas in question because its proof involved an averaging of interstate and intrastate gas sales
(which the court held were non-comparable sales), stated:
Appellant's evidence fails in another area. Its cause of action is for value as
though the gas were sold when run from day to day. [citation omitted]. Appellant
offered no evidence of any gas which was sold on a day by day basis; its evidence was
from contract sales and there was no evidence of lessees or producers selling their gas
in open market or on a day to day basis. Appellant seeks recovery for the gas sold in
that manner, but offers no evidence of what gas would bring when marketed in that
manner.
First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1977, writ-granted).
This portion of the Weatherford court's decision seems to suggest that only sales of gas
on the "spot market" would be comparable sales for one seeking to assert a Vela claim.
Such a position seems open to criticism. In part, Vela held that gas committed to long-term
contracts is sold whenever a delivery of the gas is made to the purchaser. See Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968). Since all gas being sold is customarily
delivered every day, under Vela such gas is sold every day whether it is sold on the "spot
market" or under a long-term contract. Thus, it seems inconceivable that there is any gas
not sold on a daily basis under the Vela rationale. Since the royalty owner in Weatherford
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most exclusively over whether sales of gas in the intrastate and
interstate markets constitute comparable sales of gas. This issue
was addressed directly in Middleton, First NationalBank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp.,6 Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, " Kingery v.
Continental Oil Co.," and, by implication, in Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co.66
In Middleton, the sales to be valued were sales made in intrastate commerce. The lessee, Exxon Corporation (Exxon), in providing a market price valuation for this gas proposed to take into account sales of gas made in interstate commerce from the same
field, with their accompanying lower prices. These interstate sales
had been included by Exxon in calculating its "field price", which,
according to Exxon, was conclusive of the market value of the subject gas. Briefly, Exxon's "field price" is a weighted average price
derived by reference to the weighted average price of all sales of
gas in an area composed of Texas Railroad Commission District 3
and seven adjoining counties. 7 The court of civil appeals in Middleton, however, rejected the use of Exxon's "field price" for market price valuation of the subject intrastate gas because the price
of the interstate sales involved in the calculation of the field price
was a regulated price fixed by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC) and, therefore, not indicative of the actual market value of
the unregulated intrastate gas sales involved." On this basis, the
court held that interstate sales were not comparable sales to those
made in the intrastate market. Since the sales in interstate compresented evidence of allegedly comparable sales (albeit intrastate rather than interstate
sales), under Vela the Weatherford court had evidence of "daily gas sales" before it. Thus,
this part of the Weatherford court's reasoning seems curious.
63. 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted).
64. 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
65. 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. 573 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Exxon divides the total price reported as paid for one month in each quarter of the
year for the gas delivered to major purchasers in that marketing area by the total volume of
gas delivered in that area to those purchasers during that time. The quotient yields a volume-weighted average price for most of the gas sold in that area for a period of time two or
three months before the time for which Exxon is attempting to set its field price. From that
volume-weighted average price Exxon projects the current weighted average field price and
pays royalty on the basis of that projected weighted average price. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d
240 (Tex. 1981).
68. Id. at 362.
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merce included in Exxon's "field price" were considered by the
court not to be comparable to the intrastate gas sales in question,
Exxon's "field price" was held not to be an accurate reflection of
the market value of the subject gas. 9
In contrast to Middleton, the Jefferson Land Co. decision approved the use of Exxon's "field price" for purposes of fixing the
market value royalty of gas sold in intrastate commerce, subject
only to the exclusion of all sales of gas made under pre-1973 gas
sale contracts. Jefferson Land Co. involved the interpretation of a
royalty clause which required the payment, as royalty, to the royalty owners of "the market value at the well of one-eighth (1/8) of
the gas so sold or used. 7 0 The issue before the court was the same
as that presented in Middleton: whether the market value of
purely intrastate sales of gas could be determined by reference to
Exxon's "field price," which was calculated by taking into account
both interstate and intrastate sales of gas from the field in
question. 1
Reaching a result diametrically opposed to the Middleton decision, the Jefferson Land Co. court summarily held that Exxon's
"field price" for all gas sold by all producers in the particular area
was a proper method of determining the market value of the intrastate gas. The court did, however, limit the gas sales that could be
included in Exxon's "field price" calculation to those sales made
pursuant to contracts entered into after January 1, 1973,' reason69. Id. at 362. In the precise words of the court:
We overrule Exxon's contention that its "field price" is the appropriate measure
of the market value of the gas produced from appellees' leases in 1973, 1974 and 1975.
Exxon's field price is computed, in part, on the basis of sales of gas in interstate
commerce. The price of gas sold in interstate commerce during 1973, 1974 and 1975
was regulated by the Federal Power Commission. [citation omitted]. Frederick M.
Perkins, Exxon's vice-president for production, testified that the price set by the FPC
on gas sold in interstate markets was lower than the price the gas would bring if sold
in intrastate markets in Texas. The parties have stipulated that, at all times material
to this dispute, all of the gas produced from wells located on the appellees' leases was
sold in intrastate markets in Texas. Exxon's field price, therefore, is based on sales of
gas that are not comparable to sales of gas produced from wells located on the appellees' leases, and may not be an accurate reflection of the market value of that gas.
Id. at 362-63.
70. Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. See id. at 831. This was the same field price calculation that was involved in the
Middleton case.
72. Id. at 831.
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ing that the gas sold under contracts made prior to that date was
sold at prices reflecting the low market value of gas during that
period, and if those sales were included in the present market
value determination, the resulting market value would be depressed to an artificially low level. 78 Thus, the ultimate holding of
the Jefferson Land Co. court was that Exxon's "field price," calculated by reference to all sales of all gas produced from the field
(even gas committed to the regulated interstate market) and sold
pursuant to gas sale contracts entered into after January 1, 1973,
constituted the market price of the unregulated intrastate gas
involved.
This aspect of comparability was also raised in a context which
presented the opposite circumstances from those involved in Mid74
dleton and Jefferson Land Co. In Kingery v. Continental Oil Co.,
Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins,7 5 and First National Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp.,7e the lessors proposed to value the subject
sales of interstate gas by reference to higher priced sales of intrastate gas, not the lower priced interstate gas. In this manner, the
lessors sought to boost the market price of the gas involved,
thereby increasing the dollar amount allocable to the fractional
royalty to which they claimed to be entitled. In each instance, however, the court held that sales of gas in the unregulated intrastate
market were not comparable to sales of gas in the regulated interstate market.
In Kingery, the Fifth Circuit consolidated three conflicting district court decisions77 which dealt with this issue in similar factual
contexts. In each case the royalty owner brought a Vela claim with
regard to gas produced from the respective leased premises and
sold in interstate commerce under a certificate of convenience and
necessity issued by the FPC. In each case the lessee had paid royalty on such gas based upon the sales price charged and received
73. Id. at 831.
74. 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
75. 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
76. 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted).
77. See Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Hawley v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978);
Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Tex. 1977). Because the issues and
facts in these cases were essentially identical, the Fifth Circuit consolidated their appeals.
See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980). Brent and Hawley previously had been consolidated in the United States District Court.
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for the gas in the interstate market.78 In two cases,7 ' the trial court
held that intrastate (unregulated) sales were not comparable to interstate (regulated) sales and that the market value of the subject
gas should be determined solely on the basis of recent sales of comparable gas made in the interstate market.80 In the third case,"1
however, the trial court made no distinction between interstate
and intrastate markets, simply holding that the market value of
the gas involved should be established by evidence of gas sales and
negotiations for gas sales in the immediate area during the relevant
years.

82

The Fifth Circuit reversed the latter decision and affirmed the
78. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1262 (5th Cir. 1980). The Brent
and Hawley cases involved the determination of royalty payable under gas leases covering
land situated in Moore County, Texas, which had been executed in the 1920's and which
contained clauses specifying that the royalty should be paid on the basis of "the market
value at the well of one-eighth (1/8) of the gas produced, saved, and sold or used off the
leased premises." Id. at 1262. The Kingery case involved the same kind of determination
under a 1944 oil, gas, and mineral lease covering land located in Live Oak County, Texas,
which provided for gas royalty to be paid pursuant to a royalty clause identical to that
involved in Middleton. Id. at 1263. Compare Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261,
1263 (5th Cir. 1980) with Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The Kingery royalty
clause, therefore, required that the royalty owners contend that the subject gas sales' had
occurred "off the premises" rather than "at the well" in order to properly assert that a
market value determination with respect to this gas was necessary.
The United States District Court in Kingery agreed with the royalty owners that their
gas had been sold "off the premises" and held that royalty should have been paid on the
basis of the gas market value. The Brent and Hawley royalty clauses did not raise this issue.
The Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue of lease construction raised in Brent and Hawley
because of its decision with respect to the market value evidence.
79. See Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Hawley v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
These cases were heard together before the United States District Court and combined in
one opinion.
80. The court further held that such market value was identical to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) (the regulatory successor to FPC) ceiling price because all
comparable gas in the area was being sold at such ceiling price. Because the subject gas had
been sold at that ceiling price (its market value), the court denied the royalty owners any
recovery. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth
Circuit expressly withheld opinion on this conclusion by the United States District Court.
See id. at 1265.
81. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 626 F.2d
1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. The royalty owners' expert witnesses made no attempt to include interstate sales in
their market value testimony, basing their opinion solely upon area sales of otherwise comparable gas made in the intrastate market. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d
1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1980).
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former two holding that "where the gas has been irrevocably dedicated to the interstate market, it follows inexorably that the only
comparable sales to be used in determining the market value of
such gas are sales on the interstate market." 88 The two types of gas
markets were not comparable, the court stated, because interstate
gas could not be sold on the intrastate market. The gas, therefore,
had no value on the intrastate market according to the court, because persons contracting for the sale of interstate gas could not
lawfully specify a price for such gas in excess of that allowed by
federal regulations, such as the higher intrastate gas price.8 ' Thus,
the prices charged in these two forms of sale were clearly non-comparable. The court limited its decision to this holding, however,
expressly refusing to state that the sales price of the interstate gas
involved was conclusive of its market value.85
Hemus and Weatherford also squarely addressed the comparability of interstate and intrastate gas markets. The Hemus court,
writing prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kingery, anticipated
the Fifth Circuit's decision. Phrasing the issue as being "[w]hat
sales are properly considered comparable in determining the 'market value' of gas dedicated to interstate commerce?", 86 the Hemus
court unequivocally concluded that for the purpose of determining
the market value of interstate gas as the basis for royalty payments, "interstate sales [of gas] are comparable but intrastate sales
'8 7
are not.

83. Id. at 1264. The court correspondingly stated that "sales on the intrastate market
are not comparable in determining the market value of such gas." Id. at 1264. It should be
noted, however, that there is a motion for rehearing pending before the Fifth Circuit. By
letter dated May 11, 1981, all counsel of record were notified that the court would not act on
the petitions for rehearing until the Texas Supreme Court decides Weatherford.
84. Id. at 1264.
85. Id. at 1264 n.3. The court distinguished J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104
(5th Cir. 1966) on this basis. See cases and materials cited note 26 supra. The court, in
withholding opinion on this point, must have been contemplating a situation where the actual market price of interstate gas would be below the regulated ceiling price.
86. Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 861-62 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Hemus involved the construction of a 1961 lease, the production from which was sold and dedicated
to interstate commerce. The royalty owners' expert predicated his market value testimony
upon "comparable" sales in the intrastate market. The lessee's expert rendered alternative
opinions on the market value of this gas-one based solely on interstate sales of comparable
gas and the other premised upon a weighted average of the prevailing prices in all current
sales (regulated and unregulated) in the market area. Id. at 862.
87. Id. at 862. The court considered the case to be controlled entirely by Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966). See cases and material cited note
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The Weatherford court was the first Texas appellate court required to determine the market value of gas sold in the interstate
market. In Weatherford, it was undisputed that the gas had been
irrevocably dedicated to the regulated interstate market and that
the royalty payable thereon was calculable on the basis of the market value of the gas.88 The royalty owners attempted, however, by
reference to gas sold in intrastate commerce, to establish a higher
market value for the subject gas than that on which their royalty
had been paid. As the Hemus court before it, and the Kingery
court after it, the Weatherford court rejected the notion that a sale
in the intrastate market is comparable to a sale in the interstate
market, reasoning that "[s]ales in [the] intrastate market were
based on what willing buyers and willing sellers agreed to, while
sellers and buyers of [the subject] gas could not contract for a
price above that allowed by federal regulation. Evidence of a price
arrived at above the federally regulated price would not be admissible as comparable." 8' 9
26 supra. In this regard, the Hemus court quoted and adopted the following test articulated
in Weymouth as being applicable to determine the market value of gas dedicated to interstate commerce:
What would a willing seller and a willing buyer in a business which subjects them and
the commodity to restriction and regulation, including a commitment for a long period of time, agree to take and pay with a reasonable expectation that the FPC would
approve the price (and price changes) and other terms and then issue the necessary
certificate of public convenience and necessity?
Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
88. The dedication of this gas to interstate commerce had been accomplished under an
FPC approved 25-year gas contract executed in 1967. There were two leases involved, both
with nearly identical gas royalty provisions which essentially ordered the lessee to deliver, in
kind to the lessor 3/32ds of all the oil and gas produced and saved from the lease or to pay
to the lessor 3/32ds of the value of all oil and gas produced and saved from the lease. See
First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1980, writ granted).
89. Id. at 786. The royalty owners suggested fixing a theoretical market value by reference to intrastate sales. The Weatherford court had little difficulty in finding that since the
lawsuit presented a request for an actual, not theoretical, money award, and an actual, not
theoretical, determination of royalty rights, its decision should be based upon an actual, not
theoretical, market value. Id. at 786. Interestingly, the court, in rejecting the royalty owner's
alternative offer of evidence of other gas sales within the regulated market as comparable
sales, suggested there can be no comparable sales within the regulated market because, apparently referring to the terms of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. 6. 95-621, 92
Stat. 3350 (1978), "the regulating agency classifies and divides the gas into various categories and fixes the price for each category. With all prices fixed, we fail to see how one could
be comparable to the other to make either the 'market value'." First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted).
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Thus, immediately prior to the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Exxon v. Middleton all but one decision applying Texas'law had
reached the same result on this aspect of comparability, holding
that interstate and intrastate gas sales are not comparable sales in
applying the Vela test to establish the market value of gas for royalty calculation purposes.
C. Determining the Market Value of Gas.
In those instances in which courts held that the market value
royalty standard governed the determination of the proper amount
of gas royalty payable under oil, gas, and mineral leases, either because the royalty clause provided no alternative basis for such payment or because the alternative bases were inapplicable, the courts
were required to determine correctly the market value of the gas
involved. The Vela opinion was of little help in making this determination because although it stated that the market price of gas is
to be established by sales of gas comparable in time, quality, and
availability to marketing outlets, 0 it did not prescribe specific
standards by which other courts could assess the comparability of
gas sales.' As a result, Vela, and subsequent decisions which purported to follow Vela, exhibited a variety of methods for calculating the market value of gas.
One of the criteria of comparable sales contemplated by the Vela
test is that they occur in the same market area. Most courts faced
with post-Vela market value gas royalty determinations initially
attempted to define the market area, thereby limiting the number
of "comparable sales" to be considered.'2 In Vela, the issue of rele90. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 872-73 (Tex. 1968).
91. The Vela court simply affirmed the use, in that particularinstance, of a market
value determination premised upon a mathematical average of the prices at which all gas
produced from the field involved was sold during the four-year period in question. The court
certainly did not prescribe such a "mathematical average" formula for use in making market
value determinations. In fact, the affirmance of this method appears to have been based
heavily on the fact that actual sales of gas from this field recently had been made at prices
closely approximating the calculated market price, thus corroborating the efficacy of that
market value determination. See id. at 873. That the Vela court clearly was not enamored
with this "mathematical average field price" method, is shown by its statement that such a
calculation "is not a final answer to the difficult problem of determining market price" of
gas committed to a long-term sale agreement. Id. at 873. Thus, the Vela case provided little,
if any, guidance to other courts facing the issue of market value determination.
92. Hoffman, Oil and Gas Royalty Problems-CurrentIssues and Answers, Sw. LEGAL
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vant market area was not raised, all parties conceding sub silentio
that the field constituted the appropriate market area." Nevertheless, the Vela court, in dicta, warned that an "average of all prices
paid in the field is not a final answer to the difficult problem of
determining market price."" Despite this warning, two intermediate appellate courts addressing this issue in the wake of Vela
adopted the concept that the field is the proper market area upon
which to base a market value gas royalty determination."
In Butler, the royalty owners' expert witness initially attempted
to show that the market area for the gas involved covered a sevencounty area of South Texas, but ultimately based his conclusion
with respect to the market value of the gas on "comparable" sales
which occurred in two of those seven counties during the period
covered by this suit." In reversing and remanding, the Butler
court said that because the conclusions of the royalty owners' expert had not been refuted, the trial court could apply them in determining the royalty due. The court also noted, however, that "an
actual market in the field will be practically conclusive evidence of
value.

' 97

Thus, the Butler court, while approving the use of a two

county market area in the circumstance before it, seemed to indicate that the field, given the appropriate circumstances, will constitute the relevant market area as a matter of law, unless there are
no comparable sales of gas being made from the field.
Similarly, in the court of civil appeals' decision in Middleton,
the royalty owners' expert witness selected as the relevant market
area all of Texas Railroad Commission Districts 2, 3, and 4, which
comprise a large part of the gas-producing area of South Texas,
FOUNDATION 31ST INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAX. 211, 219-21 (1980).

93. This is implicit in the decision's failure to note any conflicting testimony or argument on this issue.
94. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 873 (Tex. 1968) (emphasis added).
95. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W. 2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 413
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
96. See Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The field involved here was the Atkinson Field. The ultimate conclusion of the
royalty owners' expert as to the market value of gas produced from the field was the result
of averaging the three highest priced sales in Live Oak and Karnes Counties which occurred
during the first month of each quarter during the period involved. The prices of the gas in
these sales ranged from 32.90 per Mcf to $2.06 per Mcf. Id. at 413. The testimony of the
lessee's expert concerning market value, if any, is not reflected in the court's opinion.
97. Id. at 417 n.2.
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and calculated the market value of the gas in question by averaging the three highest prices in that area during the first month of
each calendar quarter of the years covered by the suit.9 8 The court
held that this method of determining market value did not meet
the requirements of Vela because, among other things, "the relevant marketing area is the field in which the gas was produced," 9
and the witness had ranged far beyond that field in his search for
higher prices.
By comparison, the court in Jefferson Land Co. held that the
appropriate market area for determining the market value of gas
was all of Texas Railroad Commission District 3, plus seven other
adjoining counties.'" 0 The court, however, stated its conclusion
without discussion, and it is not clear from the opinion whether
the matter of market area was contested. Likewise, the district
court decisions in Kingery and Brent, both of which were superseded on appeal, 10 1 made casual reference to the matter of market
area, but did so in terms so vague as to suggest that the issue was
not raised seriously. The Kingery district court opinion described
the relevant market area as being "the immediate vicinity"102 of
the lease, while the Brent district court decision referred to the
market area as being "the geographical area in which the wells producing such gas were located."108 No other Vela-type case ad1 4
dressed this issue. 0
98. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 357-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The field involved here was the Anahuac Field and the geographical area covered by these Railroad Commisson Districts extended from Kleberg County through the Gulf Coast into East Texas. Id. at 357. Exxon, the
lessee, contended that the true market price was equal to the Exxon "field price" which was
based on a market area covering the Anahuac Field and seven adjoining counties. Id. at 35556.
99. Id. at 362. Thus, the court, in limiting the market area to just the field, disagreed
both with Exxon's concept of the bounds of the relevant market area and the royalty owners' notion of the correct market area and the royalty owners' notion of the correct market
area.
100. Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.- Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This, of course, was precisely the market area which Exxon
used to calculate its "field price" and was the standard the Butler court rejected.
101. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1980).
102. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 626
F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
103. Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 160 (N.D. Tex.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
104. This issue was not discussed or even mentioned on appeal in Kingery, Hemus, or
Weatherford.
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Thus, as with the matter of comparability, the market value gas
royalty decisions rendered prior to the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Middleton conflicted concerning what constitutes the relevant market area for the purpose of fixing the market value of gas
involved in Vela-type claims.
The computational methods for determining the market value of
gas employed by the courts in rendering post-Vela, pre-Middleton
decisions concerning the market value of gas committed to longterm sale contracts were similarly at variance with each other.
Here again, the Vela decision did not provide much guidance for
the courts.1 05
The computational method presented in Vela consisted of a
mathematical average of the prices at which all gas produced from
the field was sold during the relevant time. Excluded from these
calculations were sales which the testifying expert considered "too
far out of line."'" This method was accepted by the Vela court as
appropriate in that case, principally because the market price produced by this method had been corroborated by recent actual sales
of gas from the field.10 7 The Vela court, however, expressly declined to adopt this method as a standard for courts to follow in
rendering future market value gas royalty decisions.1 08 As a result,
courts attempting to follow and apply Vela's test in computing the
market value of the gas involved in their own particular circumstances were left to their own devices. This was reflected in the
lack of consistency, and in some instances the lack of analysis,
shown in the decisions. The inconsistency of the post-Vela decisions in this area is especially apparent in the cases dealing with
the valuation of intrastate gas. For example, in Jefferson Land Co.
the court expressly approved the use of the Exxon "field price"
method for calculating the market value of gas committed to be
sold under a long-term contract, while the identical method was
expressly rejected for this purpose by the Middleton civil appeals
court. The Exxon "field price" is determined by dividing the total
price reported as paid for one month in each quarter of the year
for gas delivered to major purchasers in a market area consisting of

105.
106.
107.
108.

See cases and material cited note 91 supra.
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 872 (Tex. 1968).
See id. at 873.
See id. at 873.
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Texas Railroad Commission District 3 and seven adjoining counties, by the total volume of gas delivered to those purchasers in
that area and during that time. The resulting quotient constitutes
a volume weighted average price for the gas sold in that area during the two or three months before the period for which Exxon
seeks to determine its field price. Exxon projects its current
weighted average field price from this latter calculation and pays
royalty on the basis of that projected weighted average price. 10 9
As previously discussed, the Jefferson Land Co. court accepted
this computational method without analyzing its effect, slightly
modifying it to require that the method exclude prices paid under
pre-1973 gas sale agreements because the prices fixed thereunder
were too low to reflect the rapid escalation of gas prices experienced in 1973, 1974, and 1975.110 The court of civil appeals in
Middleton, on the other hand, rejected the use of the Exxon "field
price" because its methodology required the inclusion of non-comparable gas sales in determining the market value of the subject
gas."' Thus, the absence of a clear directive from the Vela court
109. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co.,
573 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
110. See Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text. In the
process, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment concerning market value
because the evidence was factually insufficient to support the values found by the lower
court. Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The trial court had rejected the opinions of all the expert witnesses
in the case and entered judgment for the royalty owners upon values which did not correspond with the testimony of any witness. Id. at 830. Both sides challenged those value findings as constituting an attempt "to split the difference" between the value figures offered by
each side. Id. at 830 n.1.
111. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). See notes 67-89 supra and accompanying
text. The court stated that its holding was further supported by Exxon's own method of
computing market value for gas produced from reservoirs discovered by drilling after January 1, 1972. With regard to such new vintage gas, Exxon, rather than using its "field price"
method, assigns the gas a market value, for royalty purposes, by computing an arithmetic
average of the three highest prices paid by a pipeline in sales of more than one million cubic
feet of gas per day in the geographical area covered by Texas Railroad Commisson Districts
1-6, adjusted to reflect the heating capacity of that gas. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571
S.W.2d 349, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.
1981). The court also noted the similarity between this method of assigning market value to
gas and that used by the royalty owners' expert. Id. at 363. For a discussion of this latter
method, see notes 114-123 infra and accompanying text.
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concerning the proper method to be used in calculating the market
value of gas involved in this type of royalty claim produced directly conflicting results in Jefferson Land Co. and Middleton.
Another method suggested in post-Vela litigation""2 as being appropriate for determining the market value of gas committed for
sale in the intrastate market under a long-term contract used as
the comparable marketing area Texas Railroad Commission Districts 2, 3, and 4118 and calculated market value of the subject gas

by averaging the three highest prices paid' 1 4 in that area during
the first month of each quarter of the period covered by the lawsuit. In making this calculation, all sales to transmission companies" 5 or to affiliates of the purchaser of the gas were excluded, as
were prices paid which were not reported to the State Comptroller's Office. 16
This computational method was analyzed in depth by the Middleton court and found unacceptable. The court agreed that transmission company sales should be excluded from any calculation of
the market value of gas on the ground that those sale prices often
include large transmission charges, rather than being limited to
consideration for the gas itself. The court also agreed with the exclusion of sales in which the seller and purchaser were affiliates
because of the risk that those sales might not be arm's-length
transactions. 17 The court, however, criticized the proffered method

112. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton 571 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.) 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
113. For discussion of the comparable marketing area concept, see notes 92-104 supra
and accompanying text. The Middleton case is discussed in connection therewith at notes
98-99 supra and accompanying text.
114. The three highest prices in the given area were paid on the basis of the "Btu"
content of the gas. This term is an abbreviation or acronym for the words "British thermal
unit" which refers to the amount of heat needed to raise the temperature of one pound of
water one degree Farenheit. Under this principle, "dry gas," that is gas with a small natural
gas liquid content, has an energy value of approximately 1031 Btu per cubic foot at standard temperature pressure while "wet gas," that is, gas having a large natural gas liquid
content, has a corresponding value of 1103 Btu per cubic foot at standard temperature pressure. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 57-58 (1978).

115. "Transmission companies" are those which transmit gas, usually by means of an
elaborate network of pipelines, valves, meters, boosters, tanks, and compressors, from a
processing plant, storage area, gathering system, or other wholesale source to one or more
distribution areas such as cities or industrial plants. Id. at 612-13.
116. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
(14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
117. See id. at 358. The blanket exclusion of all affiliate sales is subject to criticism.
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for a variety of reasons including: (1) it did not limit the relevant
market area to the field'1 8 nor did it give any weight to sales made
from the field; (2) it did not demonstrate that the sales taken into
account were comparable to those of the subject gas in terms of
time, quality, and availability to market outlet; 19 (3) it utilized
only the three highest prices paid for gas committed in long-term
contracts in the selected market area;120 (4) it made no mathematical average of all prices in the field; 21 (5) it was not corroborated
by actual, comparable sales; 12 ' and (6) its calculations were based
on data compiled quarterly rather than monthly, a method inconsistent with the time period at issue in the case. 2s
The Butler case, another decision dealing with intrastate gas,
did not address the proper method for calculating the market
value of gas in any depth. Without benefit of analysis, the court
expressly disapproved of calculating the market value of gas comObviously such sales must be carefully examined to ensure that they have been made at
arm's-length. However, if such sales are reasonably priced in relation to other non-affiliate
sales of comparable gas made in the market area during the relevant time, is there any
logical reason to exclude them from consideration? The effect of excluding or including
these sales in determining the market value of gas may or may not be significant. But if the
concept of a blanket exclusion of all affiliate sales is carried further, the result could be
extremely damaging to a lessee. For example, if gas is clearly being sold "at the well" by the
lessee but only to an affiliate, the exclusion of such a sale from consideration, under a royalty clause similar to that involved in Middleton, could result in a finding that no sale of
such gas is made "at the well." The significance of such a finding could be the difference
between calculating royalty due on the basis of the proceeds received from the sale of the
gas or making such calculation on the basis of the Vela market value standard.
118. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.]. 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). For a discussion of the court's statement concerning the relevant market area, see notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
119. See id. at 362. In this regard the court may have been referring, in part, to: (1) the
failure to take into consideration the price circumstances surrounding the contracts for the
sale of gas which were included in the market value determination; and (2) the failure to
distinguish between gas which was free to be sold each quarter, and that which was committed for sale under long-term contracts or pursuant to an interstate dedication.
120. See id. at 362. This criticism seems to refer to the failure to take into account all
sales of gas, or at least all sales of new gas, made in the market area, rather than just averaging the three highest priced sales of new gas.
121. See id. at 362. This seems to be an invalid criticism by the Middleton court because Vela, as the court itself recognized, stated "the mathematical average of all prices
paid in the field is not a final answer to the difficult problem of determining market price."
Texas Oil & Gas -Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 873 (Tex. 1968) (emphasis added).
122. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
123. See id. at 362.
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mitted for sale under a long-term contract by reference to "the volume-weighted average of all committed gas delivered in the market
area." 2' The court did, however, express some affinity for the
method offered by the royalty owners' expert, which consisted of
averaging the three highest priced sales of gas (comparable in
terms of quality, quantity, and availability) occurring in a twocounty area each quarter."'5
Thus, prior to the Texas Supreme Court's Middleton opinion,
there had been no consistency among the appellate courts applying
Texas law concerning the proper way to calculate the market value
of gas committed for sale in the intrastate market under long-term
contracts. Only one post-Vela court had expressly approved any
method offered by an expert witness,"2' and that method had been
expressly rejected by a sister court.127 Obviously, confusion prevailed with regard to this issue.
The post-Vela cases addressing the proper determination of the
market value interstate gas, although less inconsistent, were also
less helpful than those dealing with intrastate gas. Kingery and
Weatherford did not address the issue. The former simply held
that regulated and unregulated sales of gas were not comparable
sales within the meaning of the Vela test; 28 the latter held only
124. Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). One might speculate that the Butler court's rejection of this method was based
upon logic similar to that employed by the Middleton court in its analysis of the weighted
average price which constituted Exxon's "field price." That reasoning and criticism was directed at the inclusion of all sales from the field, interstate as well as intrastate, in calculating the weighted average price and did not constitute a rejection per se of all weighted
average computational methods. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
125. See Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The trial court, on remand, did not follow the suggestion of this Butler
court. The case thereafter was appealed again, this time to the San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals where the trial court's market value decision was upheld. Most of the issues in the
case were resolved under the theory that the "law of the case," as announced by the El Paso
court in the previous Butler decision, controlled. See Exxon Corp. v. Butler, 585 S.W.2d
881, 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio, 1979), writ dism'd per curiam, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
391 (May 16, 1981). After a writ of error was granted the parties settled. The supreme court,
therefore, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed the cause as moot and set aside the judgments
of the courts below. See Exxon Corp. v. Butler, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct: J. 391, 392 (May 16, 1981).
126. See Exxon Corp. v. Jefferson Land Co., 573 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 357-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
128. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
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that the royalty owners had failed to prove their claim to additional royalty on the basis of the market value of the gas because
their proof of market value had mixed sales of interstate and intrastate gas, which by definition were non-comparable sales.' 29 Hemus
was only slightly more helpful, holding that a weighted average
price derived by averaging sales of interstate and intrastate gas
was not an acceptable method for calculating market value of
gas.

13 0

The most enlightening opinion on this point dealing with interstate gas was that rendered by the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas in Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America, " one of the two consolidated cases affirmed and
superseded by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kingery." 2 Brent's
primary holding was that there are two markets for gas in every
geographical area, intrastate and interstate, and that only sales of
interstate gas were comparable to determine the market value of
gas committed for sale in the interstate market. " s Brent went further, however, and adopted the position that the market value of
the interstate gas in question was the FPC area rate prevailing for
the geographical area in which the wells producing such gas were
located, reasoning that this price was the only price being charged
129. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text. The dissenting opinion in Weatherford, however, describes the evidence of market value offered by the parties in the case. See
First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 788-89 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted) (Osborn, J., dissenting). The royalty owners' expert concluded that the market value of the subject gas was the average of the three highest prices
paid for gas in Texas Railroad Commission Districts 7c and 8. The lessee's expert based the
market value of this gas on a weighted average price of four comparable sales, arriving at a
market value ranging from 14.40 per Mcf in March 1974 to 22.6t per Mcf in April 1979. Id.
at 788-89.
130. See Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 866 (5th Cir. 1978). The Hemus
decision, however, does not constitute an absolute rejection of the weighted average price
method, since the holding on this point naturally follows from the court's position that interstate and intrastate gas sales are not comparable to each other. As noted in the text, in
Hemus, sales of both types of gas had been included in calculating the weighted average
price offered as market value; hence the disapproval of that method.
131. 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978), affd sub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co.,
626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980). The companion case, consolidated with Brent for purposes of
appeal was Hawley v. Natu'al Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex.
1978), afl'd sub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
132. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1980). See
also notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
133. See Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 160 (N.D.
Tex. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
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for interstate gas in that area.'"
D.

The Effect of Division Orders.

In an effort to avoid the impact of the Vela decision, some of the
lessees in post-Vela market value gas royalty cases contended that
the royalty provisions of their respective oil, gas, and mineral
leases had been amended by subsequent agreements such as division orders' 5 or pooling agreements.'3 S In some instances, the lessees also constructed an estoppel argument based on such agree-

ments. As with the other issues discussed previously, the decisions
in the post-Vela cases with respect to these contentions were not
uniform.
In Middleton, Sun Oil Company (Delaware) (Sun), one of the
lessees, contended that its lease, which initially had provided for
royalties based upon the market value of the gas at the wells, had
134. Id. at 160. This holding, had it not been appealed, would necessarily be limited to
its facts, insofar as it does not anticipate a situation in which interstate gas could be sold at
prices less than the applicable federal ceiling price. In such a case, the resulting market
price would be less than the regulated ceiling price. In this respect it is noteworthy that the
Fifth Circuit in Kingery did not offer an opinion concerning what is, or is not, the market
value of regulated gas. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir.
1980).
135. A division order directs the purchaser of oil or gas to make payment for the value
of the products taken to the persons, and in the proportions, set forth therein. The division
order customarily is prepared by the purchaser of the production on the basis of the ownership shown in a title opinion covering the leased premises which is prepared at the instance
of the lease operator. The purchaser will usually require that all those having an interest in
the production from the given lease execute the division order prior to the commencement
of payment thereunder. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS
159 (1978); see Bounds, Division Orders, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 5TH INST. ON OIL & GAS
LAW & TAX. 91 (1954); Ethridge, Oil and Gas Division Orders, 19 Miss. L.J. 127 (1948).
136. A pooling agreement is one which brings together separately owned interests in
small tracts of land for the purpose of obtaining a well permit under the applicable spacing
rules of the governing regulatory authority. The theory of pooling is premised upon the
prevention of drilling unnecessary and uneconomic wells which would result in physical and
economic waste. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 438-39
(1978); see Whelan v. Manziel, 314 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App-Texarkana 1958, writ refd

n.r.e.). See generally L.

HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION

(1954).

On the other hand, a unitization agreement provides for the joint operation of all, or
some, of a producing reservoir for the purpose of promoting the most efficient recovery of
the maximum amount of the reservoir's recoverable hydrocarbons. A unitization agreement
is essential for the proper utilization of pressure maintenance or secondary recovery operations with respect to common producing pools. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS
UNITIZATION

625-26 (1978). See generally L. HOFFMAN,

VOLUNTARY POOLING AND

(1954).
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been amended by division orders, the terms of which established
the proceeds received from sales of the gas produced under the
lease as the basis for royalty payments.1 37 The royalty owners contended that these division orders were not binding because they
were not supported by consideration and had been revoked unilaterally. The court of civil appeals in Middleton agreed with Sun,
holding that division orders were contracts which, in that case,
were supported by consideration and, therefore, amended the lease
royalty provisions in the manner contended by the lessee. 3 8 The
court also held that because the division orders were supported by
consideration, they could not be unilaterally revoked by the
lessors. 3 9
The effect of a division order upon a royalty obligation set forth
in an oil, gas, and mineral lease was also discussed in Butler. Butler reached the opposite result from Middleton, holding that division orders generally, and the one involved there particularly, were
executed without any consideration and, therefore, were not enforceable.14 0 By implication, the Butler court held that the division
order did not amend the lease and expressly rejected any estoppelbased contention, reasoning that the lessee had not relied upon the
division order to its detriment. 141 None of the other post-Vela
4
cases directly faced this issue.1 2
137. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The division order argument was
raised by Sun and Exxon, both lessee-defendants in the case. Exxon's division orders, however, were found to provide for the payment of royalty on the basis of the market value at
the well of the gas sold or used off the leased premises and were, therefore, held not to vary
the terms of the royalty clause contained in its lease. Sun's division orders had different
provisions, including the "life-of-the-lease" term mentioned in the text. It is Sun's division
orders which are important here and only they are discussed. The "life-of-the-lease" term of
Sun's division orders is unusual, division orders generally being made terminable at the will
of either party. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 159
(1978).
138. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The court found the necessary consideration
in the form of additional duties imposed upon Sun by the division orders which Sun had not
previously been bound to do, including keeping certain charts and records of various data
and making them available for inspection at reasonable times. Id. at 365.
139. Id. at 365.
140. Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 416-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
141. Id. at 416-17.
142. Although the effect of a division order as an amendment of a market value gas
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Thus, as with almost every other issue raised in post-Vela market value gas royalty claims, the matter of the effect of an executed
division order upon a lessee's market value royalty obligation
under an oil, gas, and mineral lease generated conflicting opinions
among courts applying Texas law to these claims. The stage was
set for, and the circumstances demanded, a clear, precise, definitive treatment of these post-Vela issues by the Texas Supreme
Court. As its vehicle to address these matters, the court selected
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton. " s
IV. Exxon Corporation v.Middleton: CLEANING

UP THE RUBBLE?

Although the factual circumstances involved in Middleton previously were described in cursory fashion, it is appropriate to review
them in more detail here. Exxon was the successor to the interest
of the lessee under four mineral leases (Exxon leases) executed between 1933 and 1935.144 Similarly, Sun was the successor to the

interest of the lessee in six other mineral leases (Sun leases) executed between 1933 and 1941.1"' All of the gas involved was produced from the Anahuac Field located in Chambers County,
royalty provision is also discussed in Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, the
court there concluded the division order's terms had not been observed by the parties and,
therefore, had been abandoned. Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp.
155, 159 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th
Cir. 1980). In Hemus & Co. v.Hawkins, the court rejected the contention that the royalty
owners had ratified the royalty payment method employed by ratifying the agreement which
pooled their lease with other leases. The court reasoned that the lease had been force pooled
and also that the lessee previously had paid royalty upon the assumption there had been no
such ratification. Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 866 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Further,
in Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., the court held there had been no ratification of the royalty payments made pursuant to division orders because the division orders involved had
expired prior to the period for which the royalty owners sought recovery. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349, 356 (W.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
See also Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 288, 290 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1979) (lessee seeking to enforce division order provision for payment of net
proceeds as royalty as against royalty owner's claim of breach of an implied covenant to use
good faith in marketing gas production from the lease), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1981); First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783,
792-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted) (Osborn, J., dissenting) (discussing division orders).
143. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
144. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1981).
145. See id. at 242.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

39

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

Texas.146 The gas produced by Exxon under its leases, was
processed at its Anahuac Gas Plant which, although not situated
on any of the Exxon leases, was located in the Anahuac Field."1 7
After processing, this gas was delivered either to the City of Anahuac, Houston Pipeline Company, or the Exxon Gas System at the
tailgate of the plant. " " The gas delivered into the Exxon Gas System, an intrastate marketing system owned by Exxon, ultimately
was sold and delivered to several industrial customers4 9 at their
respective plant gates. All of the gas produced under the Sun
leases was processed off the leased premises at Union Texas Petroleum Company's Winnie Plant. 50 During the period involved in
the suit, Sun's gas was sold and delivered to Pan American Gas
Company' at the tailgate of the Winnie Plant.
All of the gas involved in Middleton was sold in the Texas intrastate market pursuant to long-term gas sale agreements. 52 The
royalties paid by the lessees on this gas were calculated on bases
other than the market value of the gas. Exxon calculated the royalties with regard to the gas it sold to the City of Anahuac on the
basis of the proceeds actually received from the sale of that gas,
which sales were made at Exxon's field price.153 The royalties paid

by Exxon on gas delivered into the Exxon Gas System were also
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
plant where

at 242.
at 242.
at 242. Gas which remains after processing in a separator or gas processing
the liquid hydrocarbons are removed therefrom is often referred to a "residue

gas." H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 500 (1978). See Read

v. Britain, 414 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), aff'd, 422 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1967).
149. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1981). These industrial
users included Gulf States Utilities Company, E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Company, and
Neches Butane Products Company.
150. Id. at 249.
151. Id. at 249. Pan American Gas Company was a predecessor of Amoco Gas Company. The price paid by Pan American to Sun for this gas was 17.58t per Mcf. Sun calculated and paid royalties on this gas on the basis of this contract price. Id. at 249.
152. The parties stipulated that during the relevant years (1973-1975) all of the gas
from these leases was sold in intrastate markets in Texas. Id. at 246. Sun's gas was sold
under a gas contract dated July 5, 1951, as amended July 22, 1965. Id. at 249. The Middleton opinion does not state the length of the term of those contracts under which Exxon sold
its gas, but the mere filing of a market value royalty claim indicates that, at least in the
opinion of the royalty owners, the sales were made under a contract sufficiently old as to not
reflect current market prices.
153. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). The method by which Exxon calculated its "field price" is discussed at note 67 supra and accompanying text.
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based upon its field price.15 4 The royalties on the remaining Exxon
gas involved in Middleton were calculated and paid on the basis of
the proceeds received by Exxon from the sale of the gas. 150 All of
the royalties paid with regard to Sun's gas were calculated on the
basis of the proceeds received by Sun from the sale of such gas. 150
All of the Middleton gas, Sun's and Exxon's, was covered by the
provisions of various division orders which purported to direct the
payment of royalty to the persons and in the proportions specified
therein and provided for the payment of royalty on the basis of the
amount realized from the sale of the subject gas. 15 7 The gas was
also subject to the terms of a unit agreement applicable to the
Anahuac Main Frio Gas Unit No. 1.1"
The gas royalty clauses in the leases involved were remarkably
similar. The Exxon gas royalty clause provided that royalties:
on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substances, produced from said land and sold or used off the premises or in the
manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom, shall be the
market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used,
provided that on gas so sold at the wells the royalties shall be oneeighth of the amount realized from such sale.1"'
The Sun gas royalty clause provided in nearly identical terms that
Sun would pay royalty:
on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substances, produced from said land or sold or used off the premises, or used in the
manufacture of gasoline or other products therefrom, by lessee, the
market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used,
provided that on gas sold at the wells, the royalty shall be oneeighth of the amount realized from such sale.160
The Middleton royalty owners claimed that Exxon and Sun had
breached the royalty payment provisions of their respective leases
by failing to pay royalties on gas produced thereunder on the basis
154. Id. at 356.
155. Id. at 356. This gas was that which Exxon sold to the Houston Pipeline Company.

156. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 249 (Tex. 1981).
157. Id. at 249-51. This aspect of the case is analyzed in detail at notes 208-36 infra
and accompanying text.
158. See id. at 251.
159. Id. at 242.
160. Id. at 242.
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of its "market value at the well." The lessees contended that all
the sales of gas involved occurred "at the wells," within the meaning of the various gas royalty clauses, and therefore, royalties were
payable on the basis of the amount realized from the sale of the
gas involved and not on the basis of the market value of the gas."'
Alternatively, on the assumption that the market value gas royalty
standard applied, the lessees attacked the method by which the2
royalty owners sought to establish the market value of such gas, 1
and also claimed that the market value royalty standard had been
replaced by the terms of the unit agreement or the division orders
which covered the subject production. 1 3
The supreme court held with regard to the construction of the
royalty clauses that gas "sold or used off the premises" refers to
any gas sold at locations beyond the boundaries of the leased
premises, while gas "sold at the wells" includes only gas sold at the
wells located within the lease boundaries.""' This construction of
the royalty clauses caused the court to conclude that the sales of
the subject gas made at the tailgates of processing plants located
off the leased premises, had occurred "off the premises," and that,
therefore, the royalty due with respect to such gas was determina05
ble by reference to the market value of that gas.
With respect to the effect of Sun's and Exxon's division orders
upon their respective royalty obligations, the supreme court stated
that division orders are binding upon the signatories thereto only
for so long as the parties mutually act in accordance with their
terms. 66 On that basis the supreme court held, by implication,
that royalty payments made and accepted under the division orders presented discharged the lessees' royalty obligation for the period of time covered by those payments.'17 As a matter of law,

however, the court held that the division orders involved had been
revoked upon the filing of the Middleton suit'66 and thereafter did
not bind the parties. Conversely, the court held that the terms of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 243.
Id. at 244-49.
Id. at 249-52.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 251.
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the unit agreement did not alter the royalty payment obligations
fixed under the subject oil, gas, and mineral leases covering the
16 9
various tracts unitized thereunder.
The emphasis of the Middleton opinion rests, however, with the
court's discussion of the proper method of determining the market
value of gas committed to be sold under a long-term contract. The
court adopted a two-step approach to this aspect of the case. Noting that all parties agreed that the market value of gas is determinable at the time the gas is sold, the court first addressed the matter of when gas is sold and then, having resolved that issue, the
court considered how the market value of gas committed to longterm contracts should be determined.170 Regarding when gas is
"sold" for royalty purposes, the court affirmed its holding in Vela
that gas sold pursuant to long-term contracts is sold at the time of
each delivery of such gas, rejecting various arguments by the lessees which sought to discredit that aspect of the Vela decision.'
Turning to the matter of how the market value of gas committed
for sale under a long-term contract should be calculated, the court
announced the following principles of broad applicability:
1. The market value of such gas should be determined as though
the gas is free and available for sale.
2. Market value may be calculated by using sales of gas comparable in time, quality, quantity, and availability to marketing outlets.
3. Sales comparable in time are those made under contracts executed contemporaneously with the sale of the subject gas.
4. Sales comparable in quality are those of gas having similar physical properties and legal characteristics.
5. Sales comparable in quantity are those of gas sold in similar
volumes.
6. Sales of gas comparable with respect to availability of marketing
outlets are those which could have been sold to the same type of
market (e.g. intrastate or interstate).
7. Comparable sales should be drawn from the relevant market
area, which area may be, but is not required to be, the field from
169. Id. at 251-52. The court's resolution of this aspect of Middleton seems questionable and is discussed in detail herein in text accompanying notes 192-207 infra.
170. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981).
171. Id. at 244-46. Exxon's principal contention was that gas is "sold," for purposes of

making market value royalty calculations, when it is committed for sale and that occurs at
the time the long-term contract pursuant to which the sales are made is executed. See id. at
244-45.
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Applying these standards to the facts presented, the Middleton
court had little difficulty finding the existence of evidence to support the trial court's judgment adopting the market value determination of the royalty owners' expert witness. 17 The court affirmed
the trial court's finding that the relevant market area in this case
was the geographic area covered by Texas Railroad Commission
Districts 2, 3, and 4 on the basis of expert testimony that "comparable sales" occurred in this area and that gas production, consumption, and transportation facilities existed in that market area
as well."' Additionally, the court found that the sales of gas used
by the royalty owners' expert in calculating his version of the market value of the subject gas satisfied the court's conception of
"comparable 7 5sales." The sales utilized by the expert were sales of
"sweet" gas1 sold in the Texas intrastate market, the same type
of gas and the same form of sale involved in the action, and the
prices charged in these sales had been adjusted by the expert to
account for variances in the Btu content of the respective volumes
of gas, thereby furthering the comparability of the sales.' 76 Fur-

ther, although the expert used sales of varying volumes, the court
found that the volume of gas sold in these circumstances did not
affect the comparability of the prices charged for the gas.177 The
court also held the sales were comparable in their availability to
172. Id. at 246-47.
173. Id. at 249. This aspect of the case was presented to the court on various "no evidence" points of error, thus the affirmance of this part of the trial court's judgment based
upon the existence of "some evidence." See id. at 249.
174. See id. at 247. The court also found support for its approval of this area as the
relevant market area in the fact that this area is often used as the relevant market area in
price redetermination clauses-of gas sale contracts covering gas produced along the Gulf
Coast, the general geographical area from which the Middleton gas was produced. See id. at
248.
175. "Sweet" gas commonly refers to gas of high purity, that is, gas which is not contaminated with impurities such as sulphur compounds. Except for the removal of any liquid
hydrocarbons that may be present in the gas, sweet gas is ready for commercial and domestic use. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF TERMS 585 (1978).
176. The Btu content of a volume of gas refers to its heating value. The higher the Btu
content of gas, the more value it has because it possesses more heating capability. Conversely, the less Btu content possessed by a volume of gas, the less heating capability it
possesses and, correspondingly, the smaller its dollar value. Thus, for purposes of comparing
the market value of various volumes of gas, it is appropriate to compare their Btu values
and make some kind of value adjustment to reflect any variances therein.
177. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. 1981).
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marketing outlets because the gas fields in the selected marketing
area were interconnected through a network of interstate and intrastate pipelines.17 Moreover, the sales were held to be comparable in time, the parties having stipulated that the market value
determination should be made quarterly, and the evidence offered
by the royalty owners' expert having conformed to that time standard.1' 7 Finally, the court affirmed the computational method used
by the royalty owners' expert in determining market value of the
Middleton gas. This method constituted an average of the three
highest prices, adjusted for Btu content variances, charged for gas
sold in the market area during the first month of each quarter of
the period involved in the suit. 81 0
A.

"Off the Premises" or "At the Wells'?

The Middleton decision is, of course, significant in several respects, but the court's construction of the royalty clause involved
in the case is particularly important because, while royalty clauses
may vary to some extent in their express provisions, the basic royalty provision involved in Middleton is the most common form of
royalty clause used in oil, gas, and mineral leases.18 '
The court's initial task in construing the terms of the Middleton
gas royalty clause was to ascertain the intention of the parties in
using the words "sold or used off the premises" and "sold at the
wells." In attempting to perform this function, however, the court
limited its examination to the bare terms of the clause itself, basing its construction upon a grammatical analysis of the clause. Focusing upon whether the phrase "off the premises" modified the
178. Id. at 247-48.
179. Id. at 248.
180. Id. at 248. The three highest prices were used by the royalty owners' expert, and
approved by the court, on the theory that gas prices were constantly increasing during the
relevant period of time. The highest prices, the court theorized, represented the most current sales of that period and, therefore, most closely approximated the current market value
of the subject gas. In passing, it should be noted that the court rejected Exxon's contention
that its "field price," which is based upon a mixture of interstate and intrastate gas prices,
conclusively established the market value of this gas. The court held, as a matter of law,
that the mixture of interstate and intrastate sales used to determine the "field price" was
not comparable in quality to the sales of the subject intrastate gas because of the differing
legal and conceptual characteristics possessed by each category of gas. See id. at 248.
181. Hoffman, Oil And Gas Royalty Problems-CurrentIssues And Answers, Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION 31ST INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAx. 211, 214 (1980).
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word "sold" as well as the word "used," and whether the phrase
"at the wells" included sales which occurred beyond the boundaries of the leased premises, the court concluded that the term "sold
or used off the premises" referred only to sales consummated by
deliveries made at locations beyond the boundaries of the leased
premises, while the term "sold at the wells" referred exclusively to
sales made on the leased premises."'
Given the inartful wording of the royalty clause involved, the
court's analyses and conclusions concerning these matters are not
unreasonable. The interpretation accorded the language of this gas
royalty clause by the court reflects an effort to assign a harmonious
meaning to the entire clause and is premised upon a reasonable
construction of the express words used therein. However, in riveting its attention solely upon the sentence structure employed in
the Middleton royalty clause, the court effectively chose to construe the language of the clause in a vacuum, devoting almost no
attention to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
lease, or industry parlance with respect to these particular lease
terms, or any other indicia of the parties' intent. In fact, in reaching its conclusion concerning the proper construction of the gas
royalty clause, the Middleton court seems to have ignored obvious
indications that the parties' intent with respect to this clause was
contrary to that found by the court. For example, it seems curious
that in a clause in which the parties, according to the court, used
the language "off the premises" to describe an activity occurring
off the lease, they would have used, in the very next phrase of that
same clause, any language other than "on the premises" to describe the same activity occurring on the lease. In this light, it
seems doubtful that the parties intended the phrase "at the wells"
to mean "on the premises." Had the parties intended what the
court held, that is, that the lease's gas royalty clause had two distinct royalty provisions, one applicable to gas sold "off the premises" and the other to gas sold "on the premises," they easily could
have used those mutually exclusive terms. Since the parties did not
do that, a construction according that very effect to the royalty
182. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981). In so holding the
court expressly disapproved the contrary construction given this royalty clause in Butler v.
Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981).
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terms which the parties did use seems inappropriate.
The court's construction of the Middleton royalty clause also
seems inappropriate because it does not give full meaning to each
word contained in the clause. The construction given the clause by
the court is one which accords the "market value" portion of the
clause and the "amount realized" portion of the clause mutually
exclusive applicability. This interpretation, however, ignores the
meaning of the word "provided" which, as used in the royalty
clause, renders the "proceeds" part of the clause a "provisio," that
is, a clause which limits or restricts the applicability of that which
precedes it.11s With reference to the gas royalty clause, the court
held that the language preceding the proviso specified that the royalty on gas sold "off the premises" shall be based on market value;
yet the court construed the language of the proviso to apply to gas
not covered by the preceding "market value" clause, holding that
the proviso applied only to gas sold "on the premises." The court's
construction does not assign a limiting or restrictive function to
the proviso at all, ignoring the significance of that word in the
Middleton gas royalty clause. The court interpreted the clause as
though the term "provided" was not present within the clause and
thereby overlooked a significant indication that the parties intended something other than the mutually exclusive construction
given by the court to the scope of the clause's two royalty
standards.
Not only does the court's interpretation of the Middleton gas
royalty clause apparently fail to reflect the true intention of the
parties, it also seems capable of producing inequitable and unintended results among the gas producers and royalty owners of this
state. For example, the court's holding invites discriminatory treatment of gas royalty owners having interests in the same productive
area. In many instances gas is produced from contiguous leases,
gathered from the leases, and delivered to the purchaser at a central point in the field located on one of the continguous leases.1 84
Under the court's interpretation of the Middleton gas royalty

183. See South Tex. Mortgage Co. v. Coe, 166 S.W. 419, 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1914, no writ).
184. Such a central delivery point most often occurs when the gas involved is processed
at a centrally located separator or processing plant, with delivery of the residue gas made to

the purchaser at the tailgate of the processing facility.
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clause, the royalty owner under a lease covering the land on which
the delivery is made would receive royalty on his gas measured on
the basis of the proceeds received from its sale, while the royalty
owners under another lease in the same field whose gas is delivered
to its purchaser at some point beyond their lease's boundaries
would be paid royalty on the basis of the market value of the gas.
Today, when the market value of gas is subject to fluctuation, the
discriminatory effect upon the royalty owners in such circumstances is obvious. It seems unfair that the court's holding potentially would produce varying royalty consequences of such a substantial economic nature as to gas of the same quality produced
under leases covering land located in the same field. Differing royalty treatment resulting from the fortuitous location of the delivery
point of the gas in question is an unreasonable and unsatisfactory
18
consequence of the Middleton decision. 5

The potential unfairness of the court's construction of the Middleton gas royalty clause is further demonstrated by its application
to leaseholds of varying size. In Texas, oil, gas, and mineral leaseholds vary greatly in size.1 Applying the Middleton gas royalty
formula, deliveries of gas occurring anywhere on the leased premises, whether that lease be 1/10th of an acre or 85,000 acres, would
result in royalty on that gas being calculated on the basis of the
proceeds received from its sale, and not by reference to its market
185. An excellent illustration of the absurd results which could be generated by the
court's construction of this clause appeared in one of Exxon's briefs filed with the court.
Exxon hypothesized a situation that involved the delivery of a volume of gas one foot inside
the boundary of the lease from which it was produced and the delivery of another volume of
gas produced from a neighboring lease in the same field and reservoir one foot beyond the
boundary of the neighbor's lease. Under the court's interpretation of this gas royalty clause,
the difference of one foot in the delivery point would make the royalty on the first volume of
gas determinable by reference to the proceeds of its sale and the royalty on the second
volume of gas determinable by reference to its market value. The actual dollar differential
between such royalty calculations created by a variance of one foot in the delivery point of
the gas could be staggering.
186. Some leases are as small as 1/10th of an acre. See Benz-Stoddard v. Aluminum
Company of America, 368 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1963). Other leases can be as large as 85,000
acres. See W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 509, 19 S.W.2d 27, 27
(1929). Additionally, in some instances the wellhead is not even located on the lease itself,
as where the lease is being produced through directional wells. In such a case, and assuming
the applicability of a royalty clause similar to that involved in Middleton, the court's interpretation could produce the bizzare result of having a sale of gas with delivery precisely at
the wellhead being considered a sale "off the premises" and subject to the market value
royalty standard.
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value. This could generate the potentially inequitable circumstance
of having the royalty on gas produced from a small leasehold in a
field which is delivered just beyond the lease lines being calculated
on the basis of the market value of the gas, while royalty on similar
gas produced from a very large leasehold in the same field and delivered to the purchaser miles from the wellhead, yet still within
the lease boundaries, is calculated on the basis of the proceeds received from the sale. The parties to the Middleton lease, and parties to leases with similar gas royalty clauses as well, could not
have intended such potentially unfair results with regard to royalty
payment rights and duties. Certainly it was not intended that such
differing royalty results could arise with respect to the same quality of gas, produced from the same field or reservior, and sold to the
same purchaser, solely as a result of the placement of the delivery
point of the gas.18
Finally, an unavoidable consequence of this aspect of the Middleton decision may be that the delivery point of any gas produced
under leases having gas royalty clauses similar to that construed in
Middleton will become a matter of negotiation between lessor and
lessee at the time the lease is entered into. This would be an undesirable development in the petroleum industry because the location of the delivery point of produced gas should be governed
solely by physical operating factors and considerations of economical lease operation and should not be affected by gas royalty
standards.
Perhaps the Middleton court could have been better served by
engaging in a construction of these gas royalty clauses based upon
a practical approach to the language of the clause and the probable
intent of its drafter. One such reasonable construction of this gas
royalty clause which the court could have adopted is suggested by
the division of gas production into three categories for royalty payment purposes: (1) "gas used on the premises," (2) "gas sold or
used off the premises," and (3) simply "sold" gas. These divisions
appear in oil, gas, and mineral leases as a means of assigning dif187. In fact, the original parties to the Middleton leases could not possibly have intended that their gas royalty clauses would be construed in this manner, because when those
leases were entered into, the area covered by them was undeveloped, and no one could have

anticipated the location of the gas wells, pipelines, or delivery facilities vis-a-vis the lease
boundaries.
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fering royalty standards to gas on the basis of whether or not the
gas is being used for the mutual benefit of the parties.8 s For example, oil, gas, and mineral leases generally provide for the free use of
gas by the lessee when used "on the premises" because such gas is
consumed in connection with furthering the continued production
of hydrocarbons from the leased premises and is, therefore, consid18 9
ered to be used for the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee.
By comparison, this analysis suggests that the "market value" gas
royalty standard applicable to gas that is "sold or used off the
premises" is intended to apply to gas that is used or sold solely for
the benefit of the lessee. 190 Such gas, under this anlaysis, is that
which is either used by the lessee off the leased premises in operations on other leases in the field or that which is sold by the lessee
to others in the field under circumstances constituting something
other than their arm's-length transactions. 9 In such circumstances, this analysis suggests that the "market value" royalty
standard was necessarily included in the oil, gas, and mineral lease
as a means of measuring the amount of royalty due with respect to
such gas because there is no other reasonable standard available.
Certainly, insofar as such gas is "used" off the premises there is no
"amount realized" upon which to premise a royalty calculation
and, there being no such standard available, the "market value"
concept is a logical alternative for determining the worth of the
"used" gas. Likewise, the sales of gas made to others off the premises at something less than full value, or in circumstances indicating something other than an arm's-length transaction, require
some basis other than actual receipts for making royalty payment
calculations and the market value concept again lends itself to performing this function. Such sales, for example, could include sales
to affiliates at unreasonably low prices or to other lessees in the
field in exchange for non-monetary consideration. In each instance,
the reliance upon the market value standard results from the need
to protect the royalty owner from the consequences that follow the
use of a "proceeds" basis for royalty payments in situations which

188. The basis for this interpretation is suggested by the dissenting opinion of Chief
Judge Preslar in the Butler case. See Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417-18 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(Preslar, C. J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 418.
190. See id. at 418.
191. See id. at 418.
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do not reasonably lend themselves to that type of measure.
Conversely, under this analysis the "proceeds" or "amount realized" gas royalty standard should be applicable to all other sales of
produced gas including all arm's-length sales of such gas. This logically would follow from the notion that arm's-length sales would,
by definition, be the result of effective bargaining between the
seller and purchaser of the gas, thus eliminating the need to protect the royalty owner from the unfavorable consequences of a royalty valuation based upon a use or sale of the gas beneficial only to
the lessee. With the need to protect the royalty owner no longer
present, the corresponding need to calculate his royalty on the artificial basis of its market value also disappears. The proceeds derived from a sale of the gas which is beneficial to both the lessor
and lessee thus becomes the logical and least complex method of
calculating royalty due on such gas. Certainly this seems to be a
reasonable construction of the Middleton gas royalty clause and
one which may better reflect the true intent of the parties to that
lease and to other similar leases as well.
The words "at the wells" seem to impose a troublesome limiting
effect upon this theoretical construction of this portion of the gas
royalty clause, suggesting that the "amount realized" standard
should apply only to arm's-length sales occurring "at the wells"
and not to other arm's-length sales of gas. This would generate the
problem of how to value sales of the latter type for royalty purposes, and whether the proposed construction could be accepted in
light of the apparent failure to provide a standard for calculating
royalty on the substantial volume of gas falling within this latter
category of "sold" gas. It is not unreasonable to surmise, however,
that the drafter of the form of gas royalty clause involved in Middleton considered that arm's-length sales of produced gas would
naturally occur at the wellhead. This explanation gains credence
from the fact that sales of gas away from the wellhead often occur
at central facilities connected with the processing of the gas for the
purpose of extracting natural gas liquids therefrom, a process
which was not common at the time the Middleton lease was
executed.
For these reasons, the hypothetical construction of the Middleton gas royalty clause suggested herein is a reasonable alternative
to the grammatical construction proffered by the court, and one
which better reflects the intent of the parties who agreed to be
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bound by its provisions.
B. The Effect of Unitization Agreements and Division Orders
Upon the Construction of the Gas Royalty Clause.
After construing the terms of the Middleton gas royalty clause in
the manner discussed above, the court turned its attention to
whether the terms of the division orders and the unitization agreement altered the gas royalty payment obligations set forth in the
gas royalty clauses. The court found that the division orders
amended the lessees' royalty payment obligations only for the period in which the royalty owners accepted royalties tendered thereunder without objection, and held that the terms of the unitization
agreement did not modify these obligations at all. 192 Both conclusions are at least questionable, if not erroneous.
1. Unitization Agreements. Portions of the Middleton leases
were unitized, as to gas produced from one specific producing horizon, into the Anahuac Main Frio Gas Unit No. 1.18 The unitization of this gas reservoir entitled all gas royalty owners under
leases included in the unit to receive royalty on gas produced from
the reservoir, whether or not such production was obtained
through wells located on their respective leaseholds. 194 The Middleton lessees contended that the provisions of the unitization
agreement effectively amended the gas royalty clause contained in
the Middleton leases so that the provisions of the clause applicable
to sales of gas "at the wells" should be construed to apply to sales
of gas "on the unit." 189 Under this construction, since all of the
Middleton sales occurred within the unitized area, all of them
would have constituted sales "at the wells," and the royalty payable thereon would have been calculable on the basis of the proceeds received from those sales rather than the market value of the
gas. The court rejected this contention, holding that the express
terms of the unitization agreement provided that gas royalty payments remained calculable by reference only to the royalty clauses
contained in the respective leases involved, without regard to the

192.
193.
194.
195.

Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 249-52 (Tex. 1981).
See id. at 251; Exxon Corporation's Motion for Rehearing at 21.
See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 251 (Tex. 1981).
See id. at 251.
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terms of the unitization agreement. 196 This aspect of the Middleton decision appears contrary to established Texas law and, at
best, is a questionable construction of the contract provisions

involved.
It is quite common for the owners of mineral interests to enter
into pooling or unitization agreements. Pooling agreements have

the effect of bringing together several small tracts which might
otherwise be ineligible for a drilling permit under local well spacing

rules.19 7 Unitization agreements, in contrast, provide for the joint
operation of all or part of a producing reservoir or field as a single
entity, without regard to surface boundary lines, for the purpose of
maximizing the reservoir's productivity and enhancing the effi-

ciency of its operation. 198 Thus, under the typical unitization
agreement, wells may be drilled or located and operations conducted on the unitized premises without reference to interior property lines. 199 Generally, these agreements specify that drilling any-

where on the unit will keep the unitized lease in effect without
payment of delay rental, and commercial production from any part

of the unit will perpetuate all the unitized leases. Each member of
the unit typically is entitled to share in all production from the

unit. Each unitized lessor relinquishes the right to have his own
tract separately developed and the right to receive all of the royal-

ties on production from the wells on his own tract, but gains the
196. See id. at 251-52.
197. See 6 H. WILLIAMS

& C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §

901 (1980). See generally L.

HOFFMAN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UTILIZATION (1954); C. MEYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING
AND UNITIZATION-VOLUNTARY AND COMPULSORY (2d ed. 1980).
198. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 901 (1980). Unitization be-

comes particularly significant during secondary recovery operations where the freedom to
flood parts of the reservoir and the location of injection wells, procedures designed to maintain reservoir pressure, are important to the continued successful recovery of hydrocarbons.
See id.
199. See id. § 952. In Texas, it is held that unitization effects a cross-conveyance of
interests in real property so that each participating royalty owner conceptually exchanges
his interest in a tract or tracts for an undivided interest in the entire unit area. See Renwar
Oil Corp. v. Lancaster, 154 Tex. 311, 315, 276 S.W.2d 774, 776 (1955); Veal v. Thomason,
138 Tex. 341, 349-50, 159 S.W.2d 472, 476 (1942). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ham,
228 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1955); Whelan v. Placid Oil Co. 198 F.2d 39, 41-42 (5th Cir.
1952). Most current unitization agreements, however, expressly negate any intent to transfer
legal title to leases or to effect any type of cross-conveyance; instead they simply create
contractual rights for the sharing of unit production. In either case, the result is the same;
the interior lease lines are obliterated and the unit area becomes, conceptually, one
property.
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right to share proportionately in royalties on production from wells
located on other of the unitized tracts.2 00 The net legal effect of
unitization, therefore, is the recognition of a unitized tract as constituting a single, amalgamated leased property, with all of the
lease contracts affecting land included in the unit constituting but
one agreement, and all of the leases considered as one lease. 0 1
Although the general effect of unitization is the creation of one
amalgamated lease, unitization agreements commonly contain language requiring the lessee under each lease contributed to the unit
to retain responsibility for the payment of royalty. The Middleton
unit agreement contained such a clause providing, in pertinent
part, that "settlement shall be made for royalties on. . .gas, or so
much thereof as if [sic] sold or used off the premises, in accordance
with the terms and provisions of each lease or other instrument
creating Royalty Owners' interest. ' ' 20 2 The Middleton court construed this provision to mean that in determining each lessee's royalty obligation, the terms of the individual unitized leases alone
controlled, effectively holding that in this respect the unitization
agreement did not substitute unit lines for surface lease boundaries. 203 Thus, under Middleton, the construction given the gas royalty standards of "off the premises" and "at the wells" as referring
to "off the lease" and "on the lease" was found not to have been
amended by the unitization agreement. In fact, under this construction royalty calculations are made in a manner totally di-

200. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 951 (1980). See also Mengden
v. Peninsula Prod. Co., 544 S.W.2d 643, 647-48 (Tex. 1976); Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 324, 327, 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1952); Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex.
425, 431, 174 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 1943); Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. See 5 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 952 (1966); H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 901 (1980).
202. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 251-52 (Tex. 1981).
203. Id. at 251-52. In so holding, the court discussed and rejected an interpretation of
the unit agreement and the gas royalty clauses proffered by various amici curiae. This interpretation was premised on the thought that the unit agreement's provisions operated to
enlarge the geographical boundaries incorporated into the gas royalty provisions of the respective leases. The suggested construction would have made royalty with respect to gas
sold anywhere within the unit area, instead of just within the leased premises, calculable on
the basis of the amount realized from the sale and would have made royalty on gas sold
beyond the unit boundaries, rather than beyond the leased premises, calculable on the basis
of the market value of the gas. The court rejected this interpretation on the basis of its
literal construction of the terms of the unit agreement. See id. at 251-52.
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vorced from the provisions of the unitization agreement and solely
in accordance with the terms of the respective lease agreement.
The construction given to this portion of the Middleton unitization agreement apparently was premised on the theory that the
agreement's specific language relating to royalty calculation abrogated the generally applicable principle of Texas law that a unit
constitutes one amalgamated leasehold. This holding may yield results that likely were not intended by the Middleton court. For
example, under the Middleton court's construction of this form of
unitization agreement and mineral lease, the royalty owners under
the unitized lease on which the delivery point of gas sold from the
unit exists would be paid royalty on the basis of the "amount realized" from the sale of the gas, even though the production may
actually have been obtained from a different lease within the unit,
while all other royalty owners in the unit would have their gas royalties calculated on the basis of the market value of the gas. In
other words, a sale "on the premises" of a unitized lease which actually produces no unit gas, would cause the royalty owners thereunder to be paid royalty on the basis of the proceeds received from
that sale, while royalty owners under the other leases in the unit,
whether or not unit gas is produced therefrom, would be required
to establish the market value of that gas in order to receive royalties in addition to that which they may have been paid.
This kind of variance in royalty payment rights and obligations
bears no relation to the expectations of the parties to a unitization
agreement who committed their property interests to the unit in
the anticipation of sharing proportionately in the benefits and
costs of production, an expectation derived from well established
Texas law. 0 4 The Middleton decision will operate to frustrate that
expectation. Now, instead of sharing proportionately in the cost of
royalty incident to the production of gas, lessees in the position of
the Middleton lessees will be required to observe varying, and in
many circumstances, inequitable gas royalty payment standards
dependent upon where the delivery of unit gas is made to its pur-

204. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 951 (1980). See also Mengden
v. Peninsula Prod. Co., 544 S.W.2d 643, 647-48 (Tex. 1976); Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 151 Tex. 324, 327, 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (1952); Brown v. Smith, 141 Tex.
425, 431, 174 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 1943); Ruiz v. Martin, 559 S.W.2d 839, 843-44 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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chaser. This result certainly could not have been within the contemplation of the unit participants at the time they entered into
the unitization agreement.
This portion of the Middleton decision also seems ill founded
because from time to time over the life of the unit, the location of
unit facilities and perhaps the delivery points of the gas being sold
from the unit may change from a point on one unitized lease to
another for purposes of economic efficiency or to increase recovery
of hydrocarbons.20 5 Changes of this kind now may also alter the gas
royalty standard, as interpreted by the Middleton decision, under
which gas royalty is calculated and paid, resulting in a corresponding alteration in the amount of royalty payments allocable to the
affected unitized leases. The gas royalty standard, in these circumstances, would necessarily change from the "amount realized"
standard to the "market value" standard whenever the location of
the sale of the gas (defined by the court to mean its delivery)
would change from "on the premises" to "off the premises." The
amount of royalty payments conceivably could remain unchanged
if the market value of the gas and its contract sale price were the
same, but more likely than not, the amount of the payments would
change to reflect any variance between the market value and the
contract price of the gas. Such a result is illogical at best, and inequitable at worst.
The location of delivery points of gas production within a unitized area should not affect the standard by which the amount of
the benefits to be derived from unit operations by individual royalty owners are calculable. If the location of these facilities or delivery points is determinative of the applicability of the "amount
realized" or the "market value" gas royalty standards, unit lessees
may begin to consider the implications for the payment of gas royalties of locating unit facilities or delivery points on specific unitized leases, rather than determining the location of these items
solely upon considerations of maximum recovery of unit hydrocarbons and maximum efficiency of unit operations. Conversely, under
these circumstances royalty owners may become reluctant to join
205. This may occur because as the reservoir continues to be depleted, the rate of depletion in one area of the reservoir may be higher than another, and engineering and geological considerations may indicate that pressure maintenance and other production techniques
could be applied more advantageously to different areas of the reservoir.
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in unit operations unless they are assured of the location at which
the unit gas will be delivered to its purchaser. In either case, implementation of Middleton's interpretation of the effect of a unit
agreement upon the gas royalty clauses contained in the unitized
leases is not likely to further the public policy of this State of encouraging the unitization of mineral leases.20 6
Despite these problems, it must be observed that the court's
construction of the relevant provisions of the Middleton unitization agreement has some support in its literal terms. The agreement, after all, does provide that gas royalty settlements shall be
made only in accordance with the various lease instruments and
makes no reference to enlarging the scope of the gas royalty standard to apply to sales of gas occurring on and off the unit area. For
that reason, the court's interpretation that the Middleton unitization agreement had no impact upon the gas royalty payment obligations of the Middleton lessees is justifiable. However, the court's
interpretation was not the only construction available to apply to
the provisions of the unitization agreement. In fact, an alternative
interpretation of these provisions, rejected by the court, to the effect that the terms of the unitization agreement effectively
amended the provisions of the gas royalty clauses contained in the
unitized lease contracts to refer to gas sales made "off the unit,"
instead of "off the premises," and "on the unit," instead of "at the
wells," seems to be a more reasonable construction of the Middle07
ton unitization agreement.
This form of interpretation would have given full effect to the
"single lease" theory of unitization which prevails under Texas law
in that the result of its implementation would have been the treatment of the entire unitized area as though it were one lease, with
sales of gas delivered anywhere within the unitized area being
equivalent for royalty purposes to sales "at the wells," and sales of
gas delivered beyond the unit jarea being correspondingly
equivalent to sales "off the premises." The other terms of the respective leases' gas royalty provisions, however, would have remained unaffected. Thus, for example, the basic royalty calculation

206. See Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 426-27, 357 S.W.2d 364, 370
(1962); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 278-88, 346 S.W.2d 801, 810
(1961).
207. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 251 (Tex. 1981).
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formula, and its distinctions between sales of gas made on or off
the leased premises, would have continued in effect. At the same
time, each unit participant would have remained responsible for its
own royalty payment obligations, in accordance with the mandate
of the unitization agreement, by reference to the individual standards contained in its respective lease. The only modification to
those lease terms would have been the substitution of the "unitized area" concept for that of the "leased premises." This form of
construction would have ensured that, as modified by the unit
agreement, the terms of the royalty clauses of the individual leases
in existence prior to unitization would have remained in effect. In
this manner, the unitization agreement and the lease agreements
covered thereby would have been harmonized in a way that would
have observed the legal effect of the "single lease" theory of unitization while giving full effect to the provisions of the unitization
agreement relating to the calculation of royalty on gas produced
from the unit area. It would have been appropriate for the Middleton court to have so construed the unitization agreement and
leases before it. Indeed, the implementation of a unitization agreement results in a unit well being considered a constructive well on
each unitized lease, and production therefrom being considered
constructive production from each unitized lease, and unit operations being considered constructive operations on each unitized
lease. It seems, therefore, by analogy, that the Middleton court
could have held that the sale (i.e. delivery) of unit gas anywhere on
the unit constituted a constructive sale on each unitized lease with
royalty calculable on the basis of the proceeds received from such
sales. The court, however, selected a different alternative; a justifiable alternative, but perhaps not the most reasonable one.
2. Division Orders. The Middleton court's treatment of the
effect of executed division orders upon the amount of royalty payable under the gas royalty cladses involved presents one of the most
controversial aspects of the Middleton decision. In Middleton,
both Exxon and Sun asserted the existence of valid division orders
signed by the royalty owners, or the predecessors of their interests,
as a defense to the royalty owners' market value gas royalty claims.
Each lessee claimed that these written instruments expressly modified the gas royalty clauses of their respective leases, establishing a
method for calculating and paying gas royalties essentially based
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upon the proceeds received from the sale of the subject gas. 0 8
Sun's division orders expressly provided that they would remain
in effect for the life of Sun's leases and set out a formula for use in
calculating royalties on gas subject to their provisions.20

This

formula was based upon the market value of the gas, but it applied
only when the gas was not sold at the tailgate of a processing
plant. For gas sold at a processing plant, as all of Sun's gas was,
Sun's division orders provided that royalty be calculated on the
basis of the proceeds of the sale. Exxon's division orders, on the
other hand, called for the payment of royalty either on the basis of
the market value of the gas or on the proceeds received from its
sale, depending upon whether the sale occurred on or off the unitized premises of which its Middleton leases formed a part.2 1 If the
sale of Exxon's gas occurred within the unit area, the amount realized from the sale served as the royalty standard; if the sale occurred beyond the unit area, the market value standard applied.
Most of Exxon's gas sales occurred on the unit premises and,
therefore, were governed by the "amount realized" royalty
standard.
Each lessee contended that at all times royalties payable with
respect to its gas had been paid, and unconditionally accepted by
the royalty owners, in accordance with its division orders. 1 ' The
lessees argued that their respective leases had been amended by
the terms of their division orders and the payments made thereunder fully satisfied their royalty obligations. Alternatively, they contended that the royalty owners, having accepted the royalty payments without complaint; were estopped to claim additional
royalties under their leases.212 The royalty owners responded, contending that they were required to sign the division orders and
that, therefore, the division orders were not the product of a true
bargain and also were unenforceable because they were unsupported by consideration. s
208. See id. at 249-51.
209. See id. at 250.
210. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6, 12-15 (Oct. 4, 1980). This is
the court's initial opinion in Middleton, which opinion was published but later withdrawn
by the court.
211. See id. at 12-15.
212. See id. at 12-15.
213. See id. at 13.
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The trial court found that Sun's division orders did not amend
the gas royalty clauses of the leases and were revocable upon written notice and, in fact, had been revoked by the royalty owners
upon the filing of suit. " " The trial court also found that prior to
revocation the division orders were supported by consideration,
and the royalty payments tendered and accepted during that time
discharged Sun's royalty obligation to that extent.18 Such payments made and accepted after that time, however, were held not
to be supported by consideration and, consequently, were not conclusive of the royalty owners' claims."s 6
The court of civil appeals held that both Sun's and Exxon's division orders constituted binding agreements supported by consideration and, therefore, were irrevocable except upon mutual agreement of the parties. 7 The court held that since Sun's division
orders modified the gas royalty standards contained in its leases,
Sun's payment, and the royalty owners' acceptance, of royalty tendered thereunder discharged Sun's royalty payment obligation."1 "
However, the court held that Exxon's division orders did not affect
its gas royalty payment obligation because they did not purport to
change the royalty payment standards established in its leases.' 19
The supreme court obviously found this aspect of the Middleton
case troublesome, writing two opinions on the case as the result of
its indecision concerning the proper disposition of this issue." s0 In
its initial opinion, the court characterized division orders as being
intended to provide a specific and "more comfortable" method for
the lessee to determine the basis upon which royalty settlements
should be made, but not being intended to allow the lessee "to
amend the lease, relieve [the lessee] of lease obligation, or secure
advantages over the lessor which could not be asserted under the
provisions of the lease.""' In short, the coui4's initial opinion con214. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981).

215. See id. at 250.
216. See id. at 250.
217. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
218. Id. at 365.
219. See id. at 363.
220. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6 (Oct. 4, 1980).

221. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6, 14 (Oct. 4, 1980). The court
described division orders in this first opinion as being instruments, signed by the royalty
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cluded that the terms of the division orders did not amend the gas
royalty provisions of the underlying leases because they were not
contracts; the contractual elements of intent, consideration, and
mutuality being absent from the circumstances surrounding their
execution.22
The court's second, and final, Middleton opinion wholly replaced
its initial decision, but basically differed from it only with reference to the disposition of the division order issue. Focusing almost
exclusively on Sun's division orders, the court made no express
statement concerning whether division orders constitute binding
contracts revocable only upon the mutual consent of the parties. In
fact, the court completely ignored all contentions raised by the lessees on this aspect of the division order issue, stating only that
"the Texas law has been that payments made and accepted under
an agreement such as these were effective until the agreement was
revoked.

22

-

With regard to Exxon's division orders, the court ex-

pressly held only that they were revoked when the royalty owners
served Exxon with copies of their pleadings," but implied that
royalty payments made and accepted under the division orders
prior to their revocation discharged Exxon's royalty obligation for
the period of time covered by the payments. 2 5
The court's statement in its final Middleton opinion concerning
the nature of gas division orders and their impact upon lease royalty obligations is severely inadequate and seems to make an erroneous assessment of applicable Texas law concerning these matters. This portion of the opinion is also vague in many respects.
For example, the opinion contains no genuine detailed discussion
of applicable Texas law regarding gas division orders; the court
owners, which specify to whom and in what percentages the royalty allocable to the subject
gas is to be paid and which are prepared for the purpose of protecting the distributor of
those royalty payments from liability for improper payment. The court also correctly noted
that gas royalty division orders are usually directed to the lessee as the operator of the lease,
rather than the purchaser of the gas, because it is the lessee who generally receives and
distributes the royalty proceeds from the sale of the gas. See id. at 13.
222. See id. at 14.
223. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981).
224. See id. at 250.
225. This part of the court's holding was not expressly stated in the opinion. However,
because the court held that the parties were bound by the terms of the division orders for
the period during which they acted under them, it seems reasonable to infer that such was
the court's opinion. The terms of the court's judgment, in any event, do expressly support
this proposition. See id. at 252.
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makes only conclusory statements in this area and those statements are supported by relatively few authorities. The opinion also
does not develop fully the relevant facts presented to the court on
this matter, failing to quote, or at least discuss in detail, the terms
of the division orders it purports to construe.2 " Correspondingly,
there is no reasonable effort, within the opinion, to apply the applicable law to the facts.
This portion of the opinion at times even becomes non-sensical.
For example, when the court attempts to describe Sun's division
order contentions it only mentions Sun's alternative contention,
that its division orders were at least binding upon the royalty owners for the period in which they acted under them without complaint."5 7 The opinion contains no reference at all to Sun's primary
argument that its division orders constituted binding agreements
which irrevocably amended the terms of the gas royalty provisions
contained in its Middleton leases. The result is an inaccurate portrayal of the contentions and issues raised in the litigation concerning the impact of executed division orders upon a mineral
lessee's gas royalty obligations.
This portion of the supreme court's opinion is further confusing
in that both the court's initial opinion and the opinion of the court
of civil appeals contain at least some discussion of the entire division order issue."' 5 In comparison to those opinions, the court's
final Middleton opinion conveys the impression that the court deliberately chose to avoid one of the basic issues presented in the
Middleton litigation, that being the effect upon a gas royalty lease
provision of an executed division order, fully supported by consideration, having a term of equal duration with the underlying lease,
226. In fact, the opinion devotes only two sentences to Exxon's division orders, stating
as a matter of law they were revoked with the service on Exxon of the Middleton suit papers. See id. at 251. There also is no effort in the opinion to compare the terms of Exxon's
division orders with Sun's division orders, even though it appears they contained completely

different language.
227. That this was, in fact, only an alternative position taken by Sun is evident from a

comparison of the supreme court's two opinions in the case and the opinion of the court
of civil appeals. Compare Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 363-65 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981) with Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6, 12-15 (Oct. 4, 1980) and Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613
S.W.2d 240, 249-51 (Tex. 1981).

228. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6, 12-15 (Oct. 4, 1980); Exxon
Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 363-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978),
rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
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and expressly made applicable to all sales of gas produced from the
lease.
The imprecise treatment of the division order issue also makes
the supreme court's final Middleton opinion appear erroneous in
some respects, especially with regard to the revocability of division
orders. By their very nature, as instruments intended to describe
to whom and in what proportion royalty payments are to be made,
division orders require some degree of flexibility in their terms to
permit changes reflecting new royalty interest owners or varying
percentages of distribution for royalty monies. For this reason,
many division orders contain statements making their provisions
terminable at will upon written notice, thereby providing an easy
means of amending their terms. With reference to division orders
of this type, courts have held that the parties are bound only to
the extent of royalty payments tendered and accepted thereunder
prior to notice of termination.'
In some cases, however, in order
to introduce some degree of stability into royalty payment obligations, parties to division orders have agreed to gas royalty payments tendered thereunder in amounts tied to the proceeds received from gas sales under specified contracts without having the
right to terminate the division orders at will. 23 0 Thus, division orders having terms of specified duration have been recognized in
Texas.
The Middleton opinion fails to recognize the existence of the latter type of division order and its implications regarding the revocability or irrevocability of division orders. The only statement in the
opinion expressly concerning the revocability of a division order is
that made with reference to Exxon's division orders, and it simply
pronounces that Exxon's division orders, as a matter of law, were
revoked simultaneously with the service of the Middleton suit papers on Exxon. It is not clear from the opinion whether the trial

229. See Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 221-22, 293 S.W.2d 884, 846-47 (1956).
230. This form of division order was involved in Union Producing Co. v. DriskeU, 117
F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1941). There the parties, by division order, had agreed that royalty due
on gas produced from the lease involved would be based on the sales price of the gas as
determined under the gas sale contract between the lessee and a third party to whom the
gas was sold. The lessor later disputed the effect of the division order, but the court held
"[wie know of no principle upon which competent persons who have agreed upon a fixed
price can after accepting it for some years, repudiate the agreement and claim more, merely
because they think the price was too low." Id. at 231.
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court found that Exxon's division orders were not supported by
independent consideration. It is likewise unclear whether Exxon's
division orders were expressly made terminable at will upon written notice. Only if one assumes the absence of independent consideration does the court's statement regarding the revocability of Exxon's division orders make sense. In such circumstances the court's
statement would accurately reflect accepted common law that a
contract unsupported by consideration is not binding at all, and
yet would give effect to the equitable principle of estoppel, binding
the parties to their conduct which was intended to induce, and did
induce, reasonable reliance thereon by another. Unless the division
orders were made terminable at will, the court's position would be
incorrect.
This portion of the court's opinion becomes completely illogical
when applied to Sun's division orders. The supreme court made no
express statement concerning the revocability of Sun's division orders. Thus, it must be presumed that the court's statement regarding the revocability of Exxon's division orders also was intended to
be applicable to Sun's division orders. Such an explanation might
have been satisfactory if Sun's division orders were silent with respect to the length of their term or if they had specified that their
provisions were terminable at will. This explanation is inappropriate here, however, because it fails to recognize that Sun's division
orders expressly provided that their terms would remain in effect
for the life of the lease. The court's failure to discuss this issue in
depth amounts to an error of grievous proportions in light of the
trial court's express finding, unchallenged on appeal and expressly
affirmed by the court of civil appeals, that Sun's division orders
were supported by consideration. These distinctions among Sun's
and Exxon's division orders render inapplicable to Sun the court's
pronouncement that Exxon's division orders were revoked as a
matter of law upon service of the Middleton suit papers on Exxon.
Thus, the court must face the very real problem that in Middleton
it declared a division order, a contractual agreement between a
mineral lessee and royalty owner, which was supported by consideration and had an express term of equal duration with the underlying mineral lease, revocable at the will of either party. The effect
of this conclusion, in terms of established contract law, is incomprehensible. The court could not have intended this result.
Reduced to its most simple form, the proposition must be that a
I
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division order is either a contract binding upon the parties and
revocable only by mutual agreement of the parties, or it is not. If
the express terms of the division order made it revocable at will
upon written notice, the proper resolution of the issue is clear; the
express terms of the division order should be declared dispositive
of the matter. Likewise, if the division order is found not to be
supported by independent consideration, it can only be binding to
the extent that the parties have accepted its terms and acted
thereunder without complaint, thereby producing some form of
ratification or estoppel. In any event, it should be clear that a division order supported by independent consideration, no matter how
slight,2 3 ' is a binding contract just as any agreement and should be
enforced in accordance with the intent of the parties, as embodied
in the division order's express terms.
'In Middleton, every element of a contract existed in Sun's division orders, if not in Exxon's. The trial court found that Sun's royalty owners deliberately entered into the division orders in 1952.282
The proposal set forth therein for the calculation of royalty payable on gas produced under Sun's leases, according to the reported
opinions, was accepted by the parties and Sun, in reliance thereon,
calculated and paid royalties which were received by the royalty
owners without objection for more than twenty years. 8' Moreover,
as found by the trial court, in these division orders Sun agreed to
perform additional duties which it theretofore had not been obligated to do. The division orders contained an express provision
making them effective for the life of the underlying lease. The provisions of these division orders are clear; no contention of ambiguity with respect to them appears in the court's opinion. Since the
elements of a valid and binding agrement apparently existed with
231. See City of Beaumont v. Fertitta, 415 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex. 1967); Wright v.
Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473, 478, 154 S.W.2d 637, 640 (1939); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
121 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(c) (1932). Furthermore, the court's
holding in its initial opinion that a division order is not a contract conflicts with several
Texas cases dealing with that subject. See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Wall. 156 Tex. 217, 221,
293 S.W.2d 844, 846 (1956); Koenning v. Manco Corp., 521 S.W.2d 691, 699 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 531 S.W.2d 805 (1975); Pan American
Petroleum Corp. v. Vines, 459 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, no writ); Le
Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. Civ. App-Texarkana 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
232. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 249-50 (Tex. 1981).
233. See id. at 249-50.
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respect to these division orders it is puzzling why the Middleton
court did not enforce them in accordance with their terms.
Certainly the Middleton Court could not have based its decision
on the Butler opinion or the district court opinions in Kingery or
Brent. None of these recent Vela-type cases were cited in Middleton's disposition of the division order issue. Moreover, although
each of those decisions rejected the division order defenses posed
to the market value gas royalty claims presented there, each is distinguishable from the situation presented in Middleton. In Butler,
unlike Middleton, there was no finding of independent consideration to support the division orders involved there, nor was there a
finding of reliance by the lessee upon the terms of the division
orders.s 4
The district court opinions in Kingery and Brent, later superseded by the Fifth Circuit opinion in the consolidated appeals of
those cases, are also distinguishable from Middleton. In Kingery
the division orders, by their express terms, applied only to sales of
gas made pursuant to a single, specified gas sale contract. The district court decision in Kingery properly held that the royalty owners were not entitled to additional royalty on gas covered by the
division orders, but could recover additional royalty on all other
gas subject to their leases.'35 In Middleton, of course, the division
orders were not limited to gas sold under specific contracts and
hence the Kingery district court opinion does not have precedential value. In Brent, the parties had never really observed or adhered to the provisions of their division orders; therefore, the district court had little difficulty in disregarding its terms. 3 6 Once
again, this presents a distinguishable situation from that presented
in Middleton where it was established that the parties had always
paid and accepted royalties calculated on the basis of the provisions of their division orders.
Thus, there appears to be no rational basis for the Middleton
court's division order analysis. Unfortunately, this part of the Middleton decision stands as the current Texas law on the subject and
234. Compare Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 416-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) with Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981).
235. See Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349, 355-56 (W.D. Tex. 1977),
rtev'd, 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).

236. See Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D.
Tex. 1978), aff'd sub noma. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
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undoubtedly will be the cause of future litigation concerning the
effect of division orders upon a mineral lessee's gas royalty payment obligations.
C. Determining the Market Value of Gas.
The major focus of the Middleton decision was, of course, the
proper determination of the market value of the gas involved. Having determined that the subject gas had been sold "off the premises," rather than "at the wells," and that the royalty thereon was
determinable by reference to the market value of that gas, rather
thamthe proceeds derived from its sale, the court shifted its attention to the matter of how the market value of gas committed to be
sold under long-term gas contracts ought to be calculated. All parties to the Middleton case agreed that the market value of the subject gas should be fixed as of the date of its sale; thus, the initial
inquiry for the court became: when is gas that is dedicated to a
long-term sale contract sold?
1. When is Gas Sold? In response to this issue, the Texas Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Vela that gas subject to a longterm sale agreement is sold with each delivery of gas to the purchaser, and that the market value of gas under the subject royalty
clauses, therefore, is determinable afresh with each delivery.2 87 The
court rejected the contention of the Middleton lessees that gas is
sold under a long-term contract at the time the contract under
which it is sold became effective. The court noted that under the
gas royalty clauses, royalty did not become payable until the gas
was "produced from said land and sold or used off the premises,"238 and concluded that the effective date of the gas sale contracts could not govern the diposition of this issue because these
contracts became effective long before gas was produced under
these leases.2 9 Since the gas was not being produced on the effective date of the gas sale contract, the court considered that the gas
was not "sold" at that time and that the market value of gas on
that date was immaterial to its determination of the market value
of the gas. The court held that under the royalty clauses, gas is
"sold" at the same time it is "used," and since gas is not "used"
237. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 245-46 (Tex. 1981).
238. Id. at 245 (emphasis by the court).
239. See id. at 245.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

67

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], No. 1, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

until it is delivered, likewise it is not "sold" until it is delivered.240
The Middleton court's holding on this issue seems inconsistent
with gas marketing realities and the probable intent of the parties
to the Middleton leases. Initially, it must be observed that concepts of gas production and delivery arguably are not relevant to a
determination of when gas is "sold" in relation to a market value
gas royalty claim, particularly as to the Middleton royalty clauses.
The term "production" in the Middleton royalty clauses is significant only in the sense it specifies that royalty is due and payable
on gas that has, in fact, been extracted from the ground. This provision simply distinguishes gas actually produced from the leasehold's known, provable reserves which have not yet been produced
and, arguably, is descriptive only of that gas which carries a royalty payment obligation.
Likewise, the concept that a sale of gas occurs only with its delivery, while perhaps applicable in other contexts, seems inappropriate for determining the market value of gas sold under a longterm contract. As is often true of other terms, the exact meaning of
the word "sold," as used in a given instrument, depends upon the
nature of the instrument and the context in which the word appears therein. Sometimes it may be intended to include both the
element of a binding contract, plus delivery of the items covered
thereby, while at other times it may refer only to a binding contract without such a delivery. For example, the delivery of property or goods under an executory contract of sale marks the time
when the executory contract of sale has become a fully executed
contract.2 " This distinction becomes significant when determining
240. See id. at 245.
241. An executory contract, of course, is one with respect to which performance has not
yet been completed; that is, it is a contract as to which something remains undone. An
executed contract is one under which performance has been completed. In a contract for the
sale of goods, delivery of those goods is the test for determining whether the contract is
executory or executed and whether, as a consequence thereof, title to the goods has passed.
This was the subject of examination in Martin v. Amis, 288 S.W. 431 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1926, judgment adopted), the sole authority cited by the court in Vela as support for its
holding that gas is sold under a long-term contract only upon delivery. In the context of
Martin v. Amis it was necessary for the court to determine when and where the executory
gas contract became executed and the title to the gas thereby passed. The court held that
these particular events occurred upon delivery of the gas. See id. at 433. Such a determination, however, does not even reach the question arising under the gas royalty clause in Middeton as to when the gas is considered as sold within the meaning of the clause. That
determination should depend entirely upon the mutual intention of the parties and should
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the time at which the items covered by the contract are "sold" for
purposes of determining who, as between the buyer and seller, has
legal title to the items. In the Vela claim context, however, the
title to the gas is not in dispute and the controversy is not between
the buyer and the seller of the gas. Instead, the matter of concern
is the amount of money that reflects the economic value of a particular reserve of gas dedicated to sale under a long-term contract.
The significant difference in the nature of these issues is at least
some indication that the royalty owners and the lessees did not
intend, in the gas royalty clause relating to the market value at the
well of the gas "sold," to observe the technical distinction between
an executed gas sale contract and a binding contract to deliver gas
in the future. Thus, the concepts relied upon by the Middleton
court in resolving the issue of when gas is "sold" under a long-term
gas sale agreement seem ill-suited to the task. In this case, it seems
that a broader definition of the term "sold," one based upon the
parties' intention as determined from all the relevant circumstances, would have afforded a more appropriate base from which
to analyze the issue.
The basic principle which should have guided the court in determining when gas is sold is that the lease provisions should be construed to reflect the mutual intention of the parties in providing
that the royalty on gas should be the market value of one-eighth of
the gas sold. That is, did the parties mutually intend that the royalties on the gas involved would be one-eighth of the market value
of gas of like quality sold in the market area and computed afresh
each day, month, or quarter with each delivery of gas to its purchaser, or did the parties, perhaps, intend something else? In determining this intent, the court should have devoted some attention to the meaning attached to the trade customs of the gas
industry as reflective of the parties' intent because it was within
that context that the lease was entered into by them.""
The marketing customs of the gas industry demonstrate that
there has never been a period when a "posted price" technique,
not necessarily coincide with the execution of the contract obligation or the delivery of the
gas and the passage of title.
242. See Wolfe v. Schuster, 591 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ)
(construction of a note); Fleming v. Todd, 42 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1931, writ dism'd) (construction of vendor's lien note).
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such as that found in the oil industry, has been used in the marketing of natural gas. Correspondingly, there has never been a convenient price bulletin for the gas industry in which a market value
for gas can readily be found. Rather, the only way gas has been
marketed is pursuant to long-term contracts24 which assume a
wide variety of forms and are not susceptible to the kind of categorization required to produce a ready-made posted price marketing
mechanism. This, coupled with the wide variances from field to
field of wellhead pressures, producible reserves, quality of gas and
other factors bearing upon the price of gas, requires that a determination of market value of gas derived from comparable sales and
made afresh for each measureable period involved be based upon
an examination of literally thousands of production records by expert witnesses. Contrary to the holding of the Middleton court, it
seems unreasonable to think that the parties to the Middleton
leases, or any other comparable oil, gas, and mineral leases, would
have intended that such a complex and expensive method be used
to compute the gas royalty payments due thereunder. In the absence of an indisputable expression of intent by the parties that
the gas royalties should be so calculated the court should have presumed that it was not the mutual intention to use such an impractical standard for calculating gas royalties.
The Middleton lessees' suggestion that the word "sold" as used
in the parties' market value royalty standard was intended by the
parties to refer to the time at which the subject gas became committed for sale under the long-term contract, although rejected by
the court, seems to be a more reasonable interpretation of this
clause. Under this approach, the market value of gas would have
been determined as of the time that the long-term contract was
made and would have properly formed the basis for royalty payments under the market value standard if the contract price fairly
represented the market value of the subject gas at the time the
contract was made. In this context, the contract price would be
viewed as the proper measure of the market value of the gas, not
because it is the actual selling price of the gas, but because the
price would, by happenstance, also represent the market value of
the gas at the time when it irrevocably was committed to be sold.
This method seems to present a sensible approach to the issue
243. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
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because the time at which the gas is committed and dedicated to a
specific purchaser under a long-term contract is the time when the
gas is truly disposed of. The gas is disposed of at this point in time
because it is then that the parties to the contract have bound
themselves to a sale of the gas at a specified price to a specified
purchaser and the gas thus committed is taken off the market for
the duration of the contract. It is only logical to assume that the
lessors and lessees under such a royalty clause would have considered the gas covered by its terms to have been "sold" as soon as a
binding agreement, whether technically executed or executory, had
been entered into investing the gas purchaser with the right to demand delivery of the gas during the full term of the contract. This
is exactly the legal result of a lessee entering into a long-term gas
sale contract. In such circumstances the lessee effectively has
bound itself to deliver all of the gas covered by the contract to the
buyer for the duration of the contract at the price specified
therein, failing which it will be liable in damages. With the terms
and conditions of the sale fixed at the time the long-term contract
is entered into, it seems clear that the gas, in fact, has been sold at
that point, and it is then that the market value determination with
respect to the gas appropriately may be made.
Had it adopted this analysis, the Middleton court could have
more reasonably concluded that gas is "sold" under a long-term
contract at the time when the contract under which it is sold was
executed. Such a construction would have been a more rational one
than that selected by the court; it certainly would have been more
consistent with industry custom and the practical, business fact
that gas sold under an executory contract of sale is committed unconditionally to sale at the time the contract is made.
2. How is the Market Value of Gas to be Determined? The
portion of the Middleton opinion dealing with how the market
value of gas committed for sale under a long-term contract is to be
determined is fraught with internal inconsistencies and premised
upon standards which will necessarily promote future litigation in
this area of the law. In addition, this part of the court's opinion is
the product of a distorted, if not illusory, view of gas marketing.
All of these deficiencies render the propriety of this aspect of the
Middleton decision highly qustionable.
Initially, it should be observed that this portion of the Middleton opinion simply holds that the market value of gas made the
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subject of a Vela claim is to be established by expert testimony,
that all such expert testimony is to be considered in all cases by
the fact finder, and that objections to the basis of such testimony
are merely to be considered by the fact finder as bearing upon the
weight to be accorded that testimony, not as barring its admissibility.2 44 The problem with this "standard" of measuring royalty pay-

ment obligations is that, in reality, it is no standard at all. Mineral
lessees and lessors, hopeful that the court would provide some sort
of definitive guideline by which they could gauge and formulate
their future gas royalty payment rights and duties, do not know
any more about these matters now than before the court issued its
decision in Middleton. Indeed, all that is known about this subject
with any degree of certainty is that the determination of the market value of gas committed for sale under a long term contract will
be made by the fact finder based upon evidence of comparable
sales of gas. This is hardly an acceptable basis upon which to premise one's calculation of royalty due upon gas production subject
to a "market value" gas royalty clause and the ultimate effect of
this part of Middleton surely will generate future litigation concerning the market value of gas.
The precise method indulged by the Middleton court for calculating the market value of gas, insofar as it purports to set a standard for this type of litigation, is also subject to criticism. The rule
announced by the Middleton court in this regard is, in effect, a
rule of "daily sales" in which the market value of gas is determined
on the basis of the most recent contracts entered into in the marketing area covering gas comparable in quality and availability to
market outlets. There is no way in which any producer can sell its
gas so as to obtain Middleton's conception of its market value. Gas
is not, and cannot be, sold on a daily basis or even on a short term
basis. 4 5 The size of the marketing investment necessary to market
gas precludes its sale on a "spot market" basis and requires the
commitment of the gas under a long-term contract. The buyer of
gas would not make a purchase on a daily or monthly basis at any
244. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 249 (Tex. 1981).
245. This information is contained in the court of civil appeals opinion in Middleton
which provides a good discussion of the historical background of these Vela-type controversies. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
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price unless in an extreme emergency.
Even if a producer could make a long-term contract for the sale
of its gas at a price equal to the highest price most recently paid in
the relevant marketing area for comparable gas, under the Middleton rule the producer could only be assured that its gas was being
sold at market value on the day first deliveries of the gas occurred.
There would be no way to know that on the following day, or the
following month, the price being received by that producer under
its contract would still represent the market value of the gas at
that time, because in the interim higher priced contracts for comparable gas in the marketing area could have been entered into by
others. Furthermore, the method approved by the court in Middleton, if carried to its logical conclusion, may result in producers being required to pay more in royalty than they receive for the entire
production from a well. On the other hand, the Middleton rule
could entitle the producer to account to its royalty owners on the
basis of an amount less than that actually received for the sale of
the gas. The former situation would occur, as currently is often
true, when the market price of gas exceeds the contract price of
the gas, whereas the latter situation would arise in a declining market situation. Such potential results seem entirely inconsistent
with what must have been the true intent of the parties and yet,
these results must be recognized as the logical extension of the
Middleton court's rule.
The court's rule of "daily sales," and the results which may be
hypothesized from its implementation, are an outgrowth of one of
the basic precepts of the Middleton opinion, that in a market
value royalty claim, "gas should be valued as though it is free and
available for sale."' 246 In this respect, the court indulged in sheer
fantasy. The object of a court required to resolve a Vela claim
should be the determination of the market value of the particular
volume of gas in question and that determination should be based
upon the peculiar circumstances of that gas, including its commitment for sale under a long-term contract. If the gas is committed
and not available for sale, then it should not be theorized to be, or
valued, otherwise. To do so simply hinders the effort to find the
true market value of that particular volume of gas. In the case of
committed gas, its market value should be determined by reference
246. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. 1981).
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to sales of gas of comparable quality, quantity, and legal character
which also has been committed for sale under a contract having a
comparable term. Failing to recognize and account for the committed nature of the gas simply results in the valuation of an actual,
existing volume of gas pursuant to a theoretical standard which in
no way reflects any of the genuine circumstances of that gas."' 7
The Middleton court's approval of assessing the market value of
gas on the basis of the average of only the three highest priced
sales of comparable gas in the relevant market area likewise yields
unreasonable results. Because this method only averages the highest priced sales of comparable gas in the area, the seller of the
highest priced gas to which the Middleton gas was compared effectively received more than market value for his gas while the other
sellers of gas in that area who sold gas at less than the average of
the three highest prices received less than market value for their
gas. 4 8 Moreover, because this type of calculation is limited to
"fresh sales" of gas in a particular month or calendar quarter, and
because the market value of gas as determined under this method
may continually shift from period to period, the one seller who did
receive at least market value for its gas, may easily not receive
market value for such gas in the following month or calendar
quarter.
Averaging the three highest prices of comparable gas as a
method of calculating the market value of gas is also inconsistent
with the court's own concept of when a sale of gas is made and its
notion of what gas sales are comparable in time. The Middleton
court held that a sale of gas is made with each delivery of gas. 4 9
The court further held that the market value of gas is to be ascer-

247. See First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted) (real, actual monetary award not theoretical market
value determination is the issue).
248. Indeed, in Middleton it was apparent that no producer in the Anahuac Field ever
received the price which, in the opinion of the royalty owners' expert witness, constituted
the market value of the subject gas. Moreover, the market price "established" by this expert's testimony was rarely received in sales made in the entire marketing area upon which
his testimony focused. In fact, no one in Railroad Commission District Nos. 2, 3, and 4 ever
received this witness's opinion of market value for gas in that area for more than one calendar quarter. See Exxon Corporation's Application for Writ of Error at 37. This, of course,
illustrates another of the potentially absurd results which may be produced by the Middleton opinion.
249. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1981).
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tained by reference to all sales of gas of comparable quality which
are comparable in time, defining that phrase to mean sales of gas
that occur contemporaneously with the sale of gas in question.25
All gas that is being produced, however, by its very nature is delivered each day because gas is constantly flowing or being pumped
into the pipeline of its purchaser. Because a sale of gas is made
with each delivery, all gas being produced from a given market
area is being sold every day. Therefore, all deliveries of gas in a
given market area constitute sales of gas that are comparable in
time to the gas in that market area which is the subject of the
market valuation study. Thus, even assuming that the MiddletonVela test is appropriate for determining the market value of gas,
the selective averaging of only the three highest priced sales of
comparable gas sold in the market area is clearly an inappropriate
device for the implementation of this test because it excludes from
consideration some sales of comparable gas from the market value
determination.
In order to ascertain the true market value of a specific volume
of gas using the Middleton-Vela test, all evidence of the market
value of that gas, and, therefore, all sales of gas comparable in time
to sales of the subject gas (which are also otherwise comparable in
terms of quality and quantity) should be considered. The selective
averaging of only the three highest priced sales of comparable gas
fails to accomplish this objective and for that reason is unacceptable. Indeed, the only method which would account for all sales of
otherwise comparable gas which are also comparable in time,
would be a volume-weighted average price method which would include the price of all comparable gas delivered in the market area.
Certainly, this would be a more realistic appraisal of the market
value of a large volume of flowing gas of comparable quality than
the restricted average method approved by the Middleton court. In
fact, it only makes sense that a volume-weighted average price of
all comparable gas sold in a given period would more closely reflect
the market value of a given volume of gas than would a selective
arithmetic average of the three highest priced sales of such gas.
The Middleton court attempted to justify its approval of the selective averaging method utilized by the royalty owners on the basis that the gas prices were constantly increasing during the period
250. Id. at 247.
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involved and, therefore, the most current market value for this gas
would necessarily be reflected by the highest priced gas that was
comparable in all other respects. "' This reasoning, however, begs
the question. The court's obligation in market value gas royalty
claims is not to find the highest priced comparable gas sold in the
market area and declare the price of that gas to be the market
value of all comparable gas. Rather, the court should direct its attention to determining the true market value of the particular volume of gas involved, based upon a comparison of all sales of all gas
sold in the relevant market area having comparable quality, quantity, legal characteristics, and market commitment.
V.

MATTERS NOT FULLY ADDRESSED IN

Middleton

Some matters bearing upon the proper determination of the
market value of gas committed for sale under a long-term contract
were not expressly addressed in Middleton, but deserve some discussion here. These matters include the propriety of considering
affiliate sales in various aspects of market value gas royalty claims,
and the impact of applicable federal statutes and regulations upon
establishing the market value of gas involved in such claims.
A.

Affiliate Sales.

The propriety of including affiliate sales in calculating the market value of gas, although mentioned, was not fully addressed, by
the Houston Court of Civil Appeals in its Middleton opinions" and
was not even referred to by the Texas Supreme Court in its Middleton decision. Because gas produced by most major petroleum
companies often is made the subject of an affiliate sale, this matter
assumes a degree of significant importance.
251. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 248 (Tex. 1981).
252. In this regard, the court of civil appeals stated:
Furthermore, Hudson correctly declined to consider sales in which the seller was an
affiliate of the purchaser because he felt that such sales might not be arm's-length
transactions. It would be manifestly unjust for a lessee to sell gas to a subsidiary or to
an affiliated firm, person or corporation for a low price and allow that company to
extract a larger price in the resale of such product. To allow a lessee to pay royalty
out of a shallow pocket while receiving proceeds in a deep pocket would be
intolerable.
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
"
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An affiliate sale of gas, of course, is one in which both the buyer
and the seller of the gas are effectively associated under, direct or
indirect, common ownership or control. 83 It is not uncommon, in
the case of a producer of gas who is part of a major, integrated
petroleum company, for the producer to sell its gas production to
another arm of the integrated company for transportation, processing, or other purposes.s If such circumstances are present in the
context of a market value gas royalty claim, an issue may be raised
concerning whether those affiliate sales properly may be considered
for any purpose in the litigation. This issue could arise in determining whether the affiliate sale may be considered in calculating
the market value of the subject gas or in determining whether the
affiliate sale may be considered in ascertaining if the subject gas is
being sold "at the well" or "off the premises."
The obvious problem in considering affiliate sales for any purpose in a market value gas royalty claim is the risk that they may
not constitute bona fide sales at all. In terms of a market value
calculation, consideration of a sale that is not a bona fide sale, that
is, one with respect to which the price or other terms were fixed by
less than arm's-length bargaining, would tend to prevent an accurate determination of the true market price valuation of the subject gas. If the affiliate sale was priced at an unreasonably low
level, consideration of the sale would drive down the resulting market price valuation of the gas; conversely, if the affiliate sale is
priced at an unreasonably high level, the market value of the gas
would be driven up. One solution to this dilemma would be the
complete exclusion of all affiliate sales from these calculations.
However, if the affiliate sale was made at arm's-length, the price
charged for the gas in such a sale would be as accurate an indication of the market value of the subject gas as any other sale, provided the other criteria of comparability are also present in the
affiliate sale. As an alternative to the complete exclusion of affiliate
sales from a market value determination, it is suggested that affiliate sales be included in such market value calculations if the affili253. See id. at 358; 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (27) (1978).
254. This would have been the case with the portion of Exxon's Middleton gas that was

ultimately sold to various industrial customers, had this gas actually been sold by Exxon's
producing affiliate to the Exxon Gas System, the company's transportation facility. In real-

ity, the Exxon gas was not sold at this point. Rather, this gas was sold to the customers, and
royalty was paid on the basis of Exxon's field price.
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ate sale is made at a price which is reasonable in light of the prices
charged in other non-affiliate gas sales in the market area. Under
those circumstances, the affiliate sale could be deemed to be an
arm's-length sale, and the price charged therein could be considered in ascertaining the market value of the subject gas. If, however, the affiliate sale deviates from these guidelines, the arm'slength nature of the sale would become suspect and the sale would
necessarily be excluded from consideration.
The effect of including or excluding affiliate sales in determining
the market value of gas may not always be significant. If, as suggested, the criterion for including or excluding these sales in a
market value determination of gas is the reasonableness of the
price charged in such sales in relation to the prices charged in nonaffiliate sales, the impact of the inclusion or exclusion of the affiliate sales often would be minimal. This logically follows because the
pricing of the "reasonable" affiliate sales would closely approximate the pricing of the other sales of comparable gas being considered in calculating the market value of the gas.
The effect of excluding affiliate sales from consideration in determining whether the subject gas is being sold "at the well" or
"off the premises," in the context of a market value gas royalty
claim, however, could be substantial. For example, if gas which is
the subject of a market value royalty claim is being sold on the
leased premises, it clearly would be sold "at the well" within the
meaning assigned that phrase by the Middleton court.2" This
would entitle the producer-lessee, having a royalty obligation governed by provisions similar to those contained in the Middleton
lease to pay royalty on such gas on the basis of the proceeds received from the sale. If, however, the only sale "at the well" is an
affiliate sale, and affiliate sales are excluded from consideration for
all purposes in litigation of this type, then, under a Middleton royalty clause, the subject gas necessarily would be found not to have
been sold "at the well," but rather to have been sold "off the premises." The significance of such a result would be the difference between calculating royalty due on such gas sales on the basis of the
proceeds received from the sale of the gas and making this calculation on the basis of the market value of the gas. In terms of a pro255. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1981) (sold "at the well"
means sold at well within leased premises).
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ducer-lessee's monetary royalty obligation, the impact could be
staggering.
The problem posed by this aspect of the affiliate sale issue could
also be resolved by reference to the reasonableness of the terms of
the affiliate sale. Certainly affiliate sales made on the basis of
terms which are unreasonable in light of the terms of non-affiliate
sales of comparable gas in the same market area should not be considered in determining whether the gas involved is being sold "at
the wells," because of the possibility that such sales may not be
bona fide transactions. But, as with market value calculations,
there appears to be no reason to exclude affiliate sales from consideration solely because the parties to the transaction are affiliates. If
the affiliate sales, in all respects, are reasonable when compared to
non-affiliate sales of comparable gas, there is no legitimate reason
to exclude them from consideration in determining whether the gas
involved is being sold "at the well" or "off the premises." To do
otherwise would needlessly penalize the producer-lessee who, for
legitimate business reasons, is selling its gas to an affiliate.
B. The Impact of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 Upon Market Value Gas Royalty Determinations.
The determination of the market value of gas subject to federal
regulation has been addressed to some degree by several courts applying Texas law.256 In each instance, however, the litigation involved a determination of the market value of gas sold prior to
December 1978, thereby indicating that only the terms of the Natural Gas Act, 5 7 and not the provisions of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 (NGPA), 58 had a bearing upon the market value determination. Moreover, in each instance the courts appeared to
face only the issue of whether interstate gas sales are comparable
in quality to intrastate gas sales, for purposes of applying the Vela
market value determination test. 5" As a result, these decisions
256. See, e.g., Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1980);
Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1978); First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ granted).
257. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1938).
258. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1978). The effective date of the NGPA was December 1,
1978. See id. § 3301; 18 C.F.R. § 270.103 (1980).
259. See, e.g., Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980) (sales
in intrastate market are not comparable to sales in interstate market in determining market
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have been helpful only to the extent they have informed litigants
that the market value of gas subject to the terms of the Natural
Gas Act may not be ascertained by reference to sales of gas made
in the intrastate market, and further, to the extent they have
demonstrated any computational method for deriving the market
value of such comparable gas. The very distinct issue of how to
calculate the market value of gas subject to the NGPA pricing provisions remains unaddressed by Texas courts.
The NGPA is a statute enacted by Congress for the stated purpose of encouraging natural gas production without providing
windfall profits to producers or gas transmission companies. 2 0
This statute, for the first time, placed sales of all gas, intrastate
and interstate, under Federal price regulations.26 1 In an effort to
accomplish its dual objectives, the NGPA has established numerous separate categories of gas for pricing purposes. 62 Collectively,

value of gas); Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (interstate
prices are not comparable to intrastate prices); First Nat'l Bank in Weatherford v. Exxon
Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1980, writ granted) (evidence of federally regulated price not admissible as comparable to intrastate price).
260. See FINAL REGULATIONS AMENDING AND CLARIFYING REGULATIONS UNDER THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT AND THE NATURAL GAS ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 16,895, 16,897 (1978).

261. See INTERIM

REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF

1978, 43

Fed. Reg. 56,448, 56,451 (1978).
262. Id. at 56,452-56,453. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, §§ 102-109, 15 U.S.C. §§
3312-3319; 18 C.F.R. §§ 271.101-.904 (1980). These categories include separate classifications
for new gas, gas produced from new onshore production wells, gas sold in interstate commerce prior to the effective date of the NGPA, gas sold in intrastate commerce, gas produced from deep wells, or tight sand formations, or for gas produced in small quantities
from nearly depleted wells. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, §§ 102-108, 15 U.S.C. §§
3312-3318; 18 C.F.R. §§ 271.101-.807 (1980). While the NGPA implemented new pricing
categories aimed at eliciting new supplies of gas, it left virtually intact the old pricing structure for interstate gas which was being sold under the Natural Gas Act on the date of enactment of the NGPA. This is accomplished by section 104 of the NGPA which applies to all
sales of gas dedicated to interstate commerce prior to November 9, 1978, the date of
NGPA's enactment. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 3314; 18 C.F.R.
§§ 271.501-.505 (1980).
Under the Natural Gas Act, the FPC had established several different price ceilings
applicable to various categories of gas committed to interstate commerce, depending upon
the vintage of the gas production involved. For example, in Opinion 699-H, the FPC established a ceiling price of 500 per Mcf for gas produced from wells commenced on or after
January 1, 1973, such ceiling price to escalate le per Mcf per year. See FPC Op. No. 699,
Doc. No. R-389-B (1974), aff'd, Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). Later, the FPC increased the ceiling price for gas produced
from wells commenced in 1973 and 1974 to 930 per Mcf, such price also to escalate 1t per
Mcf per year, and established a price ceiling of $1.42 per Mcf for gas produced from wells
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these categories account for all domestic gas production. Each category of gas has its own base ceiling price and provides for various
price changes and adjustments to that ceiling price including
monthly changes based on an inflation factor. 2" The system of

pricing is complex, requiring the participation of state agencies in
its administration and the consideration of multiple factors and
procedures in its application. One factor, however, remains constant under the NGPA-it is unlawful to sell gas at any price
higher than the maximum lawful price assigned to the category for
which the gas actually qualifies.""
For market value gas royalty claim purposes, the importance of
the NGPA rests with its obliteration of the jurisdictional distinction between intrastate and interstate gas; under NGPA, all gas
now is sold within a regulated market."5 Thus, in the context of
market value gas royalty claims, the problem regarding gas sold
after December 1978 is simply ascertaining the market value of
price-controlled gas.
As an initial proposition, it seems that to speak of the "market
value" of price-controlled gas is a contradiction in terms. Indeed,
commenced on or after January 1, 1975, with this ceiling price to escalate It per Mcf per
calendar quarter. See FPC Op. Nos. 770 and 770-A, Doc. No. RM 75-14 (1976), af'd, APGA
v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978). Still other price
ceilings in effect under the Natural Gas Act were various area rate price ceilings which applied to gas produced from wells commenced prior to January 1, 1973. See, e.g., Area Rate
Proceeding (Permian Basin Area II), 50 F.P.C. 390, 400-01 (1973). The area rate structure
applicable to such gas, however, was supplanted by a national ceiling rate which applied to
such gas until the NGPA price ceilings came into effect on December 1, 1978. See FPC Op.
Nos. 749, 749-A, 749-B, 749-C (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Tenneco Oil Co.
v. FERC, 571 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). The national
ceiling rate was 291/2t per Mcf. All of the Natural Gas Act ceiling prices were adjusted in
accordance with the Btu content and value of the gas. It is this price vintaging structure
which is preserved under section 104 of the NGPA, with the proviso that such prices are to
be adjusted monthly in accordance with an inflation factor. See Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 3314. Additionally, section 105 of the NGPA provides that the
contract price for intrastate gas shall remain the maximum lawful price for intrastate gas
subject to its terms, as increased by the applicable inflation factor. See Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 3315.
263. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, §§ 102-108, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312-3318.
264. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 3311; 18 C.F.R. § 271.101
(1980).
265. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311-3319. See Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Pennzoil Producing Co., 439 U.S. 511, 511 n.3 (1979) (all
wellhead gas, including that dedicated to intrastate market sold after December 1, 1978, is
subject to NGPA).
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the Texas Supreme Court's own definition of market value illustrates its apparent inapplicability to situations involving federally
regulated gas. As defined by the court, "market value" is "the price
property would bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires,
but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one who is under no
necessity of buying it.'

66

Certainly the price of gas dedicated to

interstate commerce, being subject to federal price ceilings, is not
derived as the result of full and free bargaining by the parties. The
federal regulatory concepts that gas once sold in interstate commerce is irrevocably dedicated to interstate commerce,261 and that
266. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981).
267. Under the Natural Gas Act, the FPC required the permanent and irrevocable dedication to interstate commerce of all gas reserves to be served by an interstate gas pipeline
as a condition to its issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the
pipeline. The issuance of such a certificate is itself a prerequisite to the construction or
operation of an interstate gas pipeline. See Nordon-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Miller, 272 F.
Supp. 125, 129 n.12 (W.D. La. 1967) (quoting H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW,
MANUAL OF TERMS 134-35 (1964)), af'd, 403 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968); 15 U.S.C. § 717f
(1938). The apparent logic for this required dedication was that the issuance of the certificate was dependent upon the ability to provide adequate, continuous, and reasonable service, the existence of which criteria, in turn, were dependent upon the presence of an adequate supply of gas. See Nordon-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Miller, 272 F. Supp. 125, 129
n.12 (W.D. La. 1967) (quoting H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF
TERMS 134-35 (1964)), af'd, 403 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968); Wheat, Administation of the Certificate Provisionsof the Natural Gas Act, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 194, 194-95 (1945); Comment, Control of Entry into the Natural Gas Pipeline Industry: The FPC and the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, 28 IND. L.J. 587, 614-15 (1953). This absolutist concept
has been ameliorated somewhat under the NGPA. Under the NGPA, gas may move from an
intrastate category to an interstate category, and vice-versa, under certain circumstances.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72, reprintedin 11979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 9161, 9166. For example, gas which at one time was sold in the intrastate
market may be resold in the interstate market and thereby become dedicated to interstate
commerce. Id. at 9166. Also, gas currently sold in the interstate market may be sold later in
the intrastate market. Id. at 9166. Further natural gas may lose its status as being dedicated
to interstate commerce if the owner of the gas acquired his leasehold interest by a reversion
or termination of the leasehold. Id. at 9166; Comment, Vela: Legacy of Conflict Over Determination of Market Value for Royalties on Intrastateand Interstate Gas and Continued
Controversy with the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 502, 524 n.152
(1979). This latter aspect of the NGPA was a direct response to the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U. S. 519 (1978), wherein
the Court held that a lessee which was operating under a lease granting it a 50-year fixed
term leasehold when it dedicated the gas reserves underlying the leasehold to interstate
commerce, bound the lessor and the reversionary interest holders to such dedication even
beyond the expiration of the lease. See id. at 525-26. Finally, under the NGPA gas is not
considered dedicated to interstate commerce, even if sold in that market, if it was dedicated
by one who had no right to explore, develop, produce, or sell such gas on May 31, 1978.
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, § 2 (18) B(iii) (I), 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (18) (B) (iii) (I) (1978).
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a producer is unable to abandon or terminate supplying gas to its
purchaser without the approval of the appropriate federal
agency,26 8 clearly belie the notion that the price of such gas is that
received by one under no obligation to sell from one under no compulsion to buy. Indeed, it seems illogical to even attempt to apply
the principles of Vela and Middleton to federally controlled or regulated gas because "there can be no 'market value' or 'market
price' in a price-regulated environment. 2' 9 From this, it follows
that the royalty payment obligation with respect to regulated gas
might appropriately be declared to be satisfied by calculating royalty on the basis of the proceeds received from the sale of the regulated gas, without regard to Vela and Middleton notions of market

value.
Assuming, however, that the concept of market value, as delineated in Vela and Middleton, is to be applibd to sales of regulated
and unregulated gas alike, the issue in terms of NGPA-regulated
gas becomes how to determine the market value of federally pricecontrolled gas. None of the gas involved in Middleton was subject
to the NGPA pricing provisions; consequently, the court in Middleton was not required to pass upon the impact of the statute's
terms in determining the market value of gas made the object of a
Vela-type claim. The court, however, did provide some guidance
for making such a determination when, in discussing various points
to consider in assessing whether gas is of comparable quality, the
court stated that "[q]uality also involves the legal characteristics of
the gas; that is, whether it is sold in a regulated or unregulated
' 270
market, or in one particular category of a regulated market.
Thus, by implication, the Middleton court provided the guiding
principle for making a market value determination: volumes of gas
which possess differing legal characteristics, such as regulated vis-

268. Under section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act, natural gas companies are prohibited
from abandoning all or any part of their facilities subject to federal jurisdiction, or any
service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the
governing federal agency. Such approval is granted only pursuant to notice and hearing and
upon a finding that continuance of service is unwarranted due to depletion of reserves or
that future public convenience or necessity permits such abandonment. Natural Gas Act,
§ 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1938).
269. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 362 n.3 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); accord, Kingery v. Continental Oil
Co., 626 F.2d 1261, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980).
270. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex. 1981).
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a-vis non-regulated gas, or such as one particular category of a regulated market vis-a-vis another category of a regulated market, are
not comparable in quality, and sales of one such volume of gas may
not be used to ascertain the market value of the other. As applied
to NGPA-regulated gas, sales of gas sold subject to the ceiling
price limitations of one category of regulated gas are comparable in
quality only to other sales of gas classified in that same regulated
category; sales of gas from any other NGPA regulated category are
not of comparable quality.
The recognition of the non-comparability of volumes of gas subject to different legal classifications and price ceilings suggests
that, for purposes of determining the market value of regulated
gas, only sales of gas within the same regulatory category as the
subject gas need be considered. This seems entirely appropriate. It
would be unreasonable to require a producer-lessee, who is free to
market its gas in only one NGPA pricing category, because the gas
is dedicated by that statute to that particular category, to pay royalty on that gas on the basis of a "market value" derived by reference to sales of gas marketed pursuant to higher price ceilings prescribed by another NGPA category of gas. Furthermore, since the
producer-lessee has no means of transferring its gas to a higher
prices NGPA category,7 1 it would be only fair to require the royalty owner to accept royalties based on the market value of that
gas as determined by reference to the prices received for comparable gas sold within that same regulated category. Indeed, a contrary approach would yield patently unfair results. For example,
under one NGPA pricing category, the producer of gas being produced and sold prior to November 9, 1978, is entitled to continue
to receive the contract price for such gas; thus, the contract price
of such gas becomes its NGPA price ceiling.' 7 If the "market
value" of that gas, for Vela claim purposes, is to be determined not
by reference to the contract price of other gas sold pursuant to
that same NGPA pricing category, but instead by resort to the
prices received (or which could have been received) in sales of oth-

271. See INTERIM REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978, 43
Fed. Reg. 56,448, 56,451 (1978) (producers may not assume a higher ceiling price under
another NGPA pricing category once the gas has been sold pursuant to an NGPA pricing
category).
272. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 3315.
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erwise comparable gas subject to another NGPA price category, it
is quite possible that the "market value" of that gas would be less
than the actual contract price received from its sale.'7 3 Thus, if the
non-comparable quality of gas subject to different NGPA categories is not observed, market value gas royalty litigants could be
faced with the anomalous result of having a court find that, for the
period in which the gas in question was subject to the NGPA and
royalties were paid upon the basis of the proceeds received from
the sale of the gas, the producer-lessee overpaid the royalty
owners.
Assuming that Texas courts will observe the implications of
Middleton concerning the variance in quality of gas subject to differing NGPA price categories, there still remains the matter of how
to compute the market value of gas subject to regulation under
that statute. One alternative would simply involve the application
of the generally applicable principles espoused in Middleton, restricting the scope of comparable gas sales to those of identically
classified regulated gas. This method, however, would be subject to
many of the same criticisms discussed in the analysis of the Middleton opinion.
Another alternative to the problem of computing the market
value of NGPA-regulated gas would equate the "market value" of
NGPA-regulated gas to the ceiling price of the applicable NGPA
pricing category. This alternative has been suggested by at least
273. In Middleton, for example, Exxon posed the following hypothetical situation.
Exxon's field price in effect for the Anahuac Field and other fields in Texas Railroad
Commission District 3 was $1.80 per Mcf for the last quarter of 1978. As indicated in
the record before the Court, some gas is now being delivered under contracts specifying as much as $2.10 per Mcf. Under the provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, the producer of such gas will be entitled to continue to receive the contract
price for the volumes of gas delivered under that contract, it having been executed
prior to November 9, 1978. However, if the market value of that gas is not to be
determined by the amount received for the gas under the contract, but instead should
be based on the price which could be received for gas from a new well drilled in the
vicinity but not subject to that contract, Section 103 of the Natural Gas Policy Act
would prescribe a maximum price for the gas production from such new well for the
month of December 1978 of $1.969 per MMbtu. Unless the gas from such new well
had an extremely high Btu content, the initial price per Mcf would be less than the
price the producer was receiving under his contract for the older gas. If the market
value of the gas sold under the contract were not to be determined on the basis of the
contract price, but on the basis of the gas from the newly completed well in December 1978, its market value would be less than proceeds of sale.
Exxon Corporation's Pre-argument Brief at 19.
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and acknowledged by another. 2 " This method would

first require the producer to ascertain the appropriate NGPA category for its gas, determine the applicable ceiling price for that category of gas as of December 1978, and adjust that ceiling price upward to reflect the applicable monthly inflation factors provided
for by the statute.7' The result of this computation would establish the "market value" of the subject gas in any given month. Certainly this alternative would inject some measure of stability into
the currently chaotic process of determining the market value of
gas committed for sale under a long-term contract and would
clearly constitute a simple, direct method for making what otherwise might be a very complex calculation. Furthermore, there is at
least some authority which supports the utilization of this method
of market value determination. 7 On the other hand, this method
would be an imprecise measure of the market value of regulated
gas. This is evident from the fact that the NGPA pricing provisions which would serve as the "market value" of such gas are ceiling prices and at least some of the gas subject to these categories is
not priced at the maximum levels prescribed by the NGPA.2 78
Thus, under this alternative the market value of all gas priced below the NGPA ceiling prices would exceed the price actually received for the gas to a greater extent than would a "market value"
ascertained by reference to an averaging process similiar to that
used in Middleton.'79 This method would, of course, benefit those
274. See Comment, Vela: Legacy of Conflict Over Determination of Market Value for
Royalties on Intrastate and Interstate Gas and Continued Controversy with the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 502, 525-29 (1979).
275. See Hoffman, Oil and Gas Royalty Problems-CurrentIssue and Answers, Sw.
LEGAL FOUNDATION 31sT INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAX. 211, 228 (1980).
276. See Comment, Vela: Legacy of Conflict Over Determinationof Market Value for
Royalties on Intrastate and Interstate Gas and Continued Controversy with the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L. J. 502, 528 (1979).
277. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U. S. 121, 124 (1950) (a case
arising under World War II price control regulations holding that market value of a certain
price-regulated commodity was equal to its ceiling price established by those price regulations); Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 161 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(stating that the FPC rate of gas is its market price), aff'd sub nom. Kingeryqv. Continental
Oil Co., 626 F. 2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980).
278. Certain types of gas initially are priced at levels below the applicable ceiling price,
while others are, in fact, immediately priced at ceiling levels. See Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, §§ 104-106, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314-3316 (1978).
279. This follows naturally from the fact that the Middleton method of averaging the
three highest prices, if utilized in these circumstances, probably would be based upon prices
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royalty owners who would have their royalties calculated on the
basis of a value higher than the actual proceeds received from the
sale of the gas and correspondingly would penalize producer-lessees. Other royalty owners and producer-lessees, however, selling
their gas at NGPA price ceilings anyway, would receive neither a
windfall nor a penalty from this method of "market value" calculation. However, considering the relative ease with which such a
computation could be made, particularly the absence of any need
to resort to weight-averaging of gas prices, or expert testimony, or
litigation to resolve factual disputes, this alternative might be the
proper solution to the problem of determining the market value of
NGPA-regulated gas for royalty purposes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the :aftermath of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, a multitude of market value gas
royalty claims were litigated with conflicting results. The court selected the case of Exxon Corp. v. Middleton as a vehicle for harmonizing these conflicting decisions. Although the court's opinion
in Middleton resolved some conflicts, it raised numerous other issues and, in some respects, failed to adequately analyze issues
often raised in market value gas royalty litigation. As a result, this
area of Texas law remains as confused and chaotic as it was prior
to the Middleton decision.
The concept of market value gas royalty determinations now appears to be firmly entrenched in Texas law and its unfortunate results and :implications undoubtedly will haunt the petroleum industries for years to come. Indeed, the problems generated by this
concept may well become intensified and more complex as these
claims begin to focus upon sales of gas made subject to the pricing
provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.

less than the ceiling price (ie. highest price alone) prescribed for the applicable NGPA category of gas.
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